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In this dissertation, I consider effects of two corporate policies on shareholder 
wealth.  First, I examine whether paying high dividends in an economy such as the 
United States, where tax on dividend income is higher than tax on capital gains, results in 
higher stock required rate of return to compensate investors for higher tax burden.  
Higher required rate of return, in turn, lowers equity valuation and decreases shareholder 
wealth.  This view is supported by the positive relationship between dividend yield and 
stock return in the U.S. data.  However, I document the above positive relationship in the 
Hong Kong market, where neither dividend incomes nor capital gains are taxed.  My 
result shows that there are unknown factors that affect both stock required rate of return 
and dividend policy.  In this case, paying high dividends might be a part of an optimal 
corporate policy, and thus does not necessarily decrease shareholder wealth. 
Second, I examine the question of whether the practice of using peer groups in 
setting  Chief Executive Officers’ (CEO) compensation results in unjustified pay, and 
thus transfers shareholder wealth to the CEOs.  I examine this issue using the mandated 
disclosure of compensation peers that began in 2006.  Although peers are largely selected 
based on characteristics that reflect the labor market for managerial talent, I find that peer 
groups are constructed in a manner that biases compensation upward, particularly in 
firms outside the Standard & Poor’s (S&P)  500.  Pay increases close only about one-
 iv 
 
third of the gap between the pay of the CEO and the peer group, however, suggesting that 
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Firms acting in the best interests of shareholders develop and implement policies 
that increase shareholder wealth.  In this dissertation, I consider effects of two corporate 
policies on shareholder wealth.  First, I examine the effect of dividend policy.  Firms can 
choose to follow either high- or low-dividend-yield policies.  I investigate whether 
paying high dividends in an economy such as the United States, where tax on dividend 
income is higher than tax on capital gains, results in higher stock required rate of return 
to compensate investors for higher tax burdens.  Higher required rate of return, in turn, 
lowers equity valuation and decreases shareholder wealth.  This view is suggested by a 
theoretical work in Brennan (1970), the CAPM with tax, and empirically verified by the 
positive relationship between dividend yield and stock return in the U.S. data. 
However, some evidence exists that challenges the first view.  The documented 
dividend yield effect is too large to be solely attributed to tax, and the effect does not vary 
across different tax regimes.  In addition, the effect is not present in large firms.  This 
evidence leads to a second view, that there are omitted factors that affect both dividend 
policy and required rate of returns.  As consequence, the yield-return relationship appears 
spurious.  In this case, paying high dividends might be a part of optimal corporate policy, 




In Chapter 3, I examine the yield-return relationship in the Hong Kong market, 
where neither dividend income nor capital gains are taxed.  In such a market, paying high 
dividends doesn’t result in higher tax burdens to investors and thus, according to the first 
view, doesn’t result in a higher required rate of return.  Alternatively, finding a positive 
relationship between dividend yields and stock returns in Hong Kong provides evidence 
to support the second view that there are omitted factors.   
I document a robust dividend yield effect in the Hong Kong market.  One percent 
difference in dividend yields relates to 1.266% and 1.262% differences in risk-adjusted 
returns using the CAPM and Fama-French models respectively.  My result is consistent 
with the second view, that there are unknown factors that affect both stock required rate 
of return and dividend policy.  In this case, paying high dividends might be a part of an 
optimal corporate policy, and thus does not necessarily decrease shareholder wealth. 
Second, I examine the effect of compensation policy.  Specifically, I consider 
whether the practice of using peer groups in setting Chief Executive Officers’ (CEO) 
compensation results in inflated pay, and thus transfers shareholder wealth to the CEOs.  
Many critics contend that the use of compensation peer groups has resulted in pay that 
cannot be justified based on economic fundamentals.  Still others argue that peer groups 
are an efficient way for the board of directors to determine a competitive pay level that is 
necessary to both retain and motivate top executives.  Chapter 2 was developed with the 
help of two coauthors: John Bizjak of Texas Christian University and Michael Lemmon 
of the University of Utah.  In this chapter, we examine the use of compensation peer 




We document evidence supporting both sides of the debate, and find that the 
wealth transfer to CEOs is relatively small.  On the one hand, we find that peers are 
largely selected based on characteristics that reflect the labor market for managerial 
talent.  Firms tend to choose peers that are of similar size and in the same industry, and 
those that exhibit similar accounting performance and similar market-to-book ratios.  In 
addition, firms are more likely to choose peer firms with similar credit ratings and similar 
geographic or product diversity.  Finally, firms are more likely to choose peers from 
industries that either supply or hire managerial talent from the firm’s own industry. 
On the other hand, we also find that peer groups are constructed in a manner that 
biases compensation upward.  In particular, firms still favor including larger firms in the 
peer groups as larger size is associated with higher pay.  In addition, firms tend to set pay 
target at or above the peer-group median pay.  The degree of biases is larger for firms 
outside the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500.  On average, the difference in total pay 
between the target peers and the sample firms is 7.5% for S&P 500 firms and 27% for 
non-S&P firms.  However, pay increases close only about one-third of the difference, 





ARE ALL CEOS ABOVE AVERAGE? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
COMPENSATION PEER GROUPS AND PAY DESIGN1 
 
2.1 Introduction 
When shareholders question lush pay, they are invariably met with a 
laundry list of reasons that businesses use to justify such packages.  
Among that data, no item is more crucial than the “peer group,” a 
collection of companies that corporations measure themselves against 
when calculating compensation.2 
 
Arguably few economic topics stir as much passion, controversy, and debate as 
CEO pay.  As the above quote illustrates, for many firms one of the driving factors in 
setting both levels of pay and pay structure is the use of compensation peer groups.  One 
of the biggest concerns with this practice, however, is that peer groups can be used to 
inflate pay levels.  For example, according to RiskMetrics, the compensation peer group 
used in 2007 by the hairstyling company Regis Corp., which owns Vidal Sassoon and 
Supercuts, included Starbucks and H&R Block—firms that are much larger, in different 
industries, and with significantly higher CEO pay than Regis.3  In general, critics of the 
use of peer group benchmarking argue that powerful CEOs and co-opted boards
                                                 
1This chapter was coauthored by John Bizjak of Texas Christian University and Michael Lemmon of the 
University of Utah.  Reprinted from Journal of Financial Economics, volume 100, issue 3, June 2011, 538-
555, with permission from Elsevier. 
2





opportunistically choose peer firms in a way that inflates CEO pay (e.g., Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004).  Moreover, the critics also contend that, given the prevalence of 
benchmarking, the opportunistic choice of peer firms has led to an upward ratcheting of 
pay levels over time. 
Alternatively, the use of competitive benchmarking can play an important 
economic role in the pay-setting process.  Properly structured, peer groups provide 
information to boards of directors for determining the competitive pay level that is 
necessary to both retain and motivate top executives.  As in any other labor market, the 
forces of supply and demand are an important determinant of wages for managers.  One 
effective way to gather information on prevailing market wages is to compare the salary 
of executives at one firm with those at other firms.  In fact, the importance of the use of 
peer groups in determining competitive wages led Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) to 
argue that “we need more effective benchmarking not less of it.”  In light of these 
competing views, the purpose of our paper is to provide evidence regarding the extent to 
which competitive benchmarking is used opportunistically (i.e., to inflate CEO pay) or 
whether peer groups are primarily structured to provide the board with useful information 
to determine the relevant market wage for the CEO. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently adopted new proxy 
disclosure rules that require firms to report the peer groups they use to set managerial 
compensation as long as the use of peer groups is material in determining pay.4  We 
gather data on compensation peer groups for firms in the ExecuComp database with 
fiscal-year ends between December 2006 and May 2007.  For this sample of firms, we 
                                                 
4The new SEC disclosure requirement became effective for fiscal years on or after December 15, 2006.  




find that 69% (808 out of 1,178 firms) report the composition of their compensation peer 
groups.   
We begin our study by examining the characteristics of firms that are selected for 
inclusion in the compensation peer group.  Consistent with the description of the 
compensation process in Murphy (1999) and with the discussion in corporate proxy 
statements, our analysis indicates that firms tend to favor peers that are of similar size and 
in the same industry, and those that exhibit similar accounting performance and similar 
market-to-book ratios.  When peers are chosen from outside the industry, they tend to be 
drawn from industries that have higher stock return correlations with the firm’s own 
industry.  In addition, firms are more likely to choose peer firms with similar credit 
ratings, similar geographic or product diversity, and firms in the S&P 500 are more likely 
to choose other S&P 500 firms as peers.  Finally, firms are more likely to choose peers 
from industries which either supply or hire managerial talent from the firm’s own 
industry.   
While these findings suggest that the selection of compensation peers reflects 
labor market considerations, the ultimate choice of the peer group is often a joint decision 
between the board, firm executives, and compensation consultants.  The potential for 
influence and conflicts of interest among these parties allows for the possibility that peer 
groups are chosen largely based on economic considerations but in a manner that biases 
compensation upward.  We identify and examine three ways that peer groups can 
potentially be manipulated to inflate pay.  First, firms can target pay at higher percentiles 
of the peer group pay distribution in order to benchmark pay against firms that have 




and have better performance, since compensation is correlated with firm size and 
performance.  Finally, holding labor market factors constant, firms may choose peer 
firms with higher compensation levels.   
With respect to the first channel, all but two of the firms in our sample target total 
pay at or above the 50th percentile of the peer group pay distribution.  For S&P 500 (non-
S&P 500) firms, 32% (27%) report using pay targets above the 50th percentile and the 
mean pay target is 56.2% (54.7%).  Targeting pay above the peer group median may be 
justified if, for example, the firm is larger or more complex than the majority of firms in 
the peer group (or in the industry).  We do not find any evidence, however, that firm size 
or complexity is associated with higher than median pay targets, which casts doubt on 
this economic rationale for targeting pay above the peer group median.   
To further examine whether firms systematically choose compensation peers in a 
manner that justifies higher pay levels, we compare the characteristics of each sample 
firm with those of the selected peer group.  For S&P 500 firms, the median peer firms are 
approximately the same size, in terms of sales revenues, and also have similar pay levels.  
In contrast, for non-S&P 500 firms the median peer firms are approximately 25% ($172 
million) larger in terms of sales revenue, and have total compensation that is 
approximately 16.5% ($365,000) higher than that of the sample firms.  These findings 
suggest that there are systematic biases in peer group selection, but that these biases 
differ considerably between S&P 500 firms and non-S&P 500 firms. 
The differences in compensation between the peer firms and the sample firms that 
we find reflect two potential sources of bias.  The first is the possibility that the peer 




differences we document for non-S&P 500 firms.  The second is the possibility that 
holding constant differences in size, performance, and other observable characteristics, 
firms can favor peers with higher pay.  To explore this latter issue, we use propensity 
score matching (PSM) to identify a matched peer group for each firm in the sample, and 
compare the characteristics of the actual peer group with those of the matched peer 
group.  Based on this analysis, we find little evidence that after controlling for the biases 
in firm size and performance, firms tend to favor higher paid peers.   
A natural question to ask is whether the biases in peer group composition are 
related to the quality of corporate governance.  We find no consistent evidence that firms 
with weak governance exhibit larger biases in peer group selection.  Instead, at least for 
non-S&P 500 firms, the inclination to select peers opportunistically appears to be 
widespread.   
The fact that smaller firms in particular exhibit larger biases in peer group 
selection is interesting in that much of the criticism of peer groups has been motivated by 
the pay of CEOs in large firms.  One possible explanation for the differences between 
S&P 500 firms and the rest of the sample is that S&P 500 firms are more visible and 
attract greater scrutiny compared to other firms, thus making it more difficult for CEOs to 
significantly influence the choice of the benchmark.  In addition, it may simply be more 
difficult to make significant adjustments to the benchmark in S&P 500 firms because 
these firms are already among the largest firms and have the most highly paid executives.   
By benchmarking themselves against larger and more highly paid peers, CEOs 
can attempt to negotiate larger pay increases than can be justified by economic 




they may exercise discretion when setting pay that mitigates the effects of peer group 
bias.  Consistent with the latter view, we find that boards make only partial adjustments 
to pay in response to pay differences between the comparison group and the CEO.  On 
average, the annual increase in compensation closes about one-third of the difference in 
pay between the CEO and the peer group in S&P 500 firms and about 27% of the pay gap 
in non-S&P 500 firms.  The fact that the upward bias in peer group pay is most evident in 
non-S&P 500 firms, but that the adjustment coefficient is smaller in these firms, suggests 
that the overall benefit to these CEOs of inflating peer group pay is relatively small. 
In the final analysis in the paper, we examine the stability of peer groups over 
time by comparing the peer groups reported in 2006 (the first year of the SEC regulation) 
with those reported in 2007.  Approximately 25% of the firms made substantial changes 
to their peer groups between the two years and those making large changes appear to do 
so in ways that reduce the biases in peer group choice.  We view this as preliminary 
evidence that the new disclosure requirements have prompted firms to be less 
opportunistic in the selection of peers, but a more definitive answer to this question will 
require additional years of data. 
Our work is related to several largely contemporaneous papers that also examine 
the effect of peer group benchmarking on CEO pay (Faulkender and Yang, 2010; 
Albuquerque, De Franco, and Verdi, 2009; and Cadman and Carter, 2009).  We differ 
from these studies on a number of dimensions: (i) We identify and examine three separate 
ways that firms can potentially manipulate the peer group to influence pay and how 
biases in peer group composition differ across S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms; (ii) we 




set of labor market factors associated with peer firm choice; (iv) we examine to what 
degree biases in peer group composition lead to increases in CEO pay; and (v) we 
provide evidence on changes in peer group composition in response to the new disclosure 
requirements.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 describes the data 
used in the analysis.  Section 2.3 provides a discussion of how peer groups are used by 
boards to set compensation and lays out our general research questions and hypotheses.  
Section 2.4 examines how firms choose peer groups and begins our analysis on whether 
peers are chosen opportunistically or to provide information about managerial labor 
markets.  Section 2.5 provides further analysis of opportunistic peer group selection.  
Section 2.6 examines how peer groups affect managerial compensation.  Section 2.7 
provides some preliminary evidence on the effectiveness of the SEC regulation by 
analyzing changes in the composition of peer groups from 2006 to 2007.  Section 2.8 
concludes with a brief summary and discussion. 
 
2.2  Data collection and summary statistics 
We begin our analysis of peer groups with the list of firms with compensation 
information reported in ExeCucomp with fiscal-year ends between December 2006 and 
May 2007.5  For each of these firms, we examine the corporate proxy statement for 2007 
and gather information on the peer group that is used to set executive compensation.  
Wherever possible, we collect compensation data for all firms in the peer group.  When 
                                                 
5Firms were required to report information on their compensation peer groups for filings at companies with 
fiscal year-ends on or after December 15, 2006.  Prior to 2006, some firms did voluntarily report the use of 
their peer groups, but it was rare.  For example, Faulkender et al. (2010) report that only 83 firms in the 




peer group firms are not part of the ExecuComp database, we collect the compensation 
data from corporate proxy statements and other sources.6  In addition to the data on the 
firms comprising the peer group, we also collect data on the target pay percentiles used 
by the firms.  Data on governance characteristics of the firms come from the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database.  Financial data are collected from 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat.  The data reflect the peer 
groups that were used to set compensation for the 2006 fiscal year.  Thus, boards would 
rely on compensation and financial data from the 2005 fiscal year in forming their 
comparisons with the peer firms.  Throughout the paper we adopt a similar timing 
convention and base our comparisons on data from fiscal year 2005. 
Out of 1,178 firms in the ExecuComp database for which we obtained proxy data 
for fiscal year 2006, we find that 808 firms report the peer group they use for setting 
executive pay.  We exclude 10 sample firms that report zero CEO compensation in either 
fiscal years 2005 or 2006.7  We further exclude 91 sample firms for which we are unable 
to obtain compensation data for all of the reported peers.  Peer firms with missing 
compensation data are generally either foreign or private firms or subsidiaries of other 
firms.  The final sample of 707 firms which we use for the majority of our analysis 
consists of 259 firms from the S&P 500 index and 448 firms outside of the S&P 500. 
                                                 
6Note that the reporting format for compensation changed in 2006, and that the reporting changes affect the 
way in which total compensation is reported in ExecuComp.  In most of our analysis, we focus on 
compensation data for 2005 (2006 proxy year), and thus, rely on data prior to the reporting changes.  In 
some analysis, we do examine changes in compensation from 2005 to 2006.  In these cases, the 
comparisons may partially reflect the reporting changes rather than real changes in compensation.  The 
changes in total compensation as reported by ExecuComp are described at 
http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/support/docs/exec/ExecutiveCompensation1.pdf. 
7
 These CEOs are generally those facing special situations.  For example, the two top executives of Google 
take no explicit compensation, but have a large ownership stake.  Although peer groups are not used to set 




Table 1 defines the variables used in our analysis and table 2 reports summary 
statistics comparing the characteristics of firms that report using peer groups for which 
we have data on all peers to those that do not report using a peer group.  Firms that do not 
report compensation peer groups are about half as large in terms of sales and assets as 
firms with complete peer data.  In addition, these firms tend to have higher CEO 
ownership, longer CEO tenure, and slightly more insiders on the board of directors.  
Finally, firms that do not report peers have lower median levels of salary and bonus 
(S&B) and total pay, but somewhat higher median ratios of salary and bonus and total 
pay scaled by sales revenue.  Firms not using peer groups also have higher ratios of 
salary and bonus scaled by total pay.  Overall, firms that do not report peers are smaller 
in size, are more closely held, and are firms where the CEO potentially has a greater 
control over compensation.  For these types of firms, compensation peers may be less 
crucial in determining CEO pay. 
Table 2 also compares the characteristics of the sample of 707 firms with 
complete data for all peer firms and the 91 firms without compensation and sales data for 
all of the peer firms.  For the most part, there are no significant differences in firm 
characteristics between the two samples with one notable exception.  Firms without 
complete data for all peers have slightly higher pay, both in terms of S&B and total pay.  
The pay measures scaled by sales revenue, however, are not different between the two 
samples.  Overall it does not appear that there are significant selection issues associated 
with having complete data for all peer firms.8 
 
                                                 
8Including firms in the analysis with missing peer data can potentially lead to incorrect inferences regarding 
the extent to which peer groups are composed to bias pay comparisons upward.  For example, if peers with 





2.3 The compensation process and peer group benchmarking 
For many publicly traded companies, compensation is set by the firm’s 
compensation committee, which is comprised of members of the board of directors.  In 
many cases, the compensation committee selects a peer or comparison group of firms that 
it uses to gather information on pay practices and pay levels.  In most firms, salary, 
bonuses, option pay, and total compensation are in some form anchored to the peer 
group.  Firms typically target the various components of pay at the median pay level of 
the comparator group.  It is not uncommon, however, for firms to target pay above the 
median (e.g., at the 75th percentile).9  Understanding how firms choose compensation 
peers provides insight into the role they play in determining managerial compensation. 
 
2.3.1 Peer groups as a gauge of managerial labor markets 
 If managerial ability is an important factor in determining firm performance, then 
the nature of the managerial labor market will play a significant role in assessing the 
amount of compensation that is necessary to retain and motivate executives.  One of the 
most important ways that a board can get information on the labor market for managers is 
to look at compensation practices in firms that it competes with for talent.  If peer group 
benchmarking is used to evaluate the reservation wage necessary to attract and retain 
qualified executives, then we expect peer firms to be selected based on factors related to 
supply and demand conditions in the managerial labor market. 
                                                 
9According to RiskMetrics, 99.5% of firms in the S&P 1500 targeted pay at or above the median of their 




Consistent with this view, corporate proxy statements frequently mention that the 
purpose of compensation peer groups is to provide information on the managerial labor 
market.  For example, the 2007 proxy statement of ATC Technologies Inc. states that the 
primary criterion for the selection of compensation peers is to provide “a broad view of 
the executive labor market against which we compete for executive-level talent.”  In what 
follows, we discuss a number of characteristics that should proxy for commonalities in 
the managerial labor market between the firm and its selected peers. 
2.3.1.1 Industry.  A natural source for compensation peers are firms in the same 
industry.  Firms that provide similar products and that are competitors for customers are 
also likely to be firms where a company will look to when trying to recruit executives.  
Corporate proxy statements also indicate that industry is an important factor when 
picking compensation peers.  For example, the 2007 proxy statement for Fossil Inc. states 
that their compensation program is “designed to be competitive with the companies in the 
industry in which we must vie for talent.” 
2.3.1.2 Firm size.  Firm size is an indicator of organizational complexity and 
scope.  Consequently, we expect firms to select as compensation peers other firms that 
are similar in size.  A reading of corporate proxy statements supports the notion that firm 
size plays an important role in peer selection.  For example, Fossil Inc. states that “the 
peer group is comprised such that the median revenue size of the peer group is at or close 
to our annual revenue.” 
 While size and industry are important factors in the selection of peer groups, firms 
often go outside their own industry when picking peers.  For example, the 2007 proxy 




Committee for appropriateness, considering such factors as size (e.g., revenue and market 
capitalization), complexity (e.g., multiple marketed products), geographic scope of 
operations (e.g., global versus domestic-only presence), etc.”  There are a number of 
reasons a firm may not pick peers from the same industry.  Large firms that dominate a 
particular industry may choose not to include other peers within the industry if the firm is 
significantly larger than its industry competitors.  Other relevant labor market factors 
include: 
2.3.1.3 Firm performance.  Firm performance may be used to identify firms for 
inclusion in the compensation peer group.  Firms with similar market-to-book ratios may 
share similarities in profit models or organizational structure (Smith and Watts, 1992), 
and firms with similar profitability may be exposed to similar demand shocks. 
2.3.1.4 Customers and suppliers.  A firm’s customers and suppliers are familiar 
with the firm’s operational structure and serve as a natural source for recruiting 
executives.  For example, executives at auto parts suppliers may have a thorough 
understanding of automobile manufacturing and provide for a pool of talent that 
automobile manufacturers can hire from.  Pharmaceutical companies might hire from 
hospitals where they sell their products.  To the degree that a firm’s customers and 
suppliers provide a resource for managerial talent, we would expect that these firms 
would be appropriate for selection as part of the compensation peer group. 
2.3.1.5 Capital markets.  Companies that are competitors for equity or other types 
of financial capital may also serve as relevant peers.  For example, the 2007 proxy 
statement for Avon Products Inc. states that peers are “selected based on the fact that the 




(bold added).”  For firms that are dominant in an industry or that have few direct 
competitors, another potential source of peer firms comes from other companies that 
investors might view as substitutes in their portfolios.  For example, the top ten firms in 
the S&P 500 have few organizations in the same industry that are similar in terms of size 
and operating characteristics.  While these firms may not be direct competitors, one thing 
they have in common is the need to raise and manage enormous sums of capital.  These 
firms may look to each other as peers or to other firms they compete with for equity 
capital. 
2.3.1.6 Diversified firms.  Diversified companies are often more complex 
organizations that require a specific set of managerial skills.  Because of this, we expect 
that diversified firms will be more likely to look to other diversified firms for executive 
talent and to be more likely to include these firms in their peer group.  Diversification 
may be measured across either product lines or across geographic regions. 
2.3.1.7 Labor flows.  Flows of executive talent between firms are a direct measure 
of the degree of substitutability of human capital.  We expect that compensation peers 
will be more likely to come from industries which either supply (demand) talent to (from) 
the firm’s industry. 
 
2.3.2 Peer groups and managerial opportunism 
Bebchuck and Fried (2004) argue that CEOs have significant ability to influence 
their own compensation because boards are co-opted or are simply ineffectual.  With 
respect to the use of compensation peer groups, Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004) note 




department, often working in conjunction with compensation consultants whose primary 
job is to provide survey information for competitive benchmarking of pay.  Moreover, in 
many instances compensation consultants cross-sell other services to the firms they work 
for (Murphy and Sandino, 2010; Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist, 2010).  In addition, the 
CEO often participates in deliberations of the compensation committee except those 
specifically dealing with the CEO’s own pay.10  While the use of compensation peer 
groups can provide valuable information to boards for determining appropriate 
compensation, the potential for weak boards and conflicts of interest in the process by 
which peer firms are chosen leaves scope for the possibility that the composition of the 
peer group will be biased in order to justify higher pay.11   
There are primarily three ways that managers can potentially influence the peer 
group selection process in a manner that enhances compensation.  Since it is well-
documented that pay is correlated with firm size and performance, executives can justify 
or seek higher pay levels if they can select firms in the peer group that are larger and 
better performing.  Besides putting larger firms in the peer group, firms can directly pick 
peers with higher levels of pay since the rules that companies use to justify inclusion of a 
firm into a peer group can be amorphous.  For example, according to the 2007 proxy 
statement of Best Buy Inc., the firm selects peers because of “admiration within their 
industry” and those that have a “track record of innovation.”  While both qualities might 
                                                 
10The 2007 proxy statement of Schnitzer Inc. discusses the role that the CEO and management plays in the 
selection of peers:  
“The CEO, with the assistance of Towers Perrin, analyzes survey data and makes 
recommendations to the Committee regarding compensation for the executive officers.  The 
CEO participates in Committee meetings at the Committee’s request to provide background 
information regarding the Company’s strategic objectives and his evaluation of the performance 
of and compensation recommendations for the other executive officers. With respect to his own 
compensation, the CEO responds to requests from the Committee.” 
11Alternatively, Hayes and Schaefer (2009) show that boards may desire to rationally inflate pay to 




be admirable, this type of selection criteria can lead to opportunistic behavior on the part 
of management.  Finally, managers may argue that pay should be benchmarked against 
higher percentiles than the median pay in the peer group (e.g., the 75th percentile).   
If managers are opportunistically selecting firms in the peer group in order to 
inflate pay, we anticipate that the composition of the peer group will deviate from the 
peer group that would be chosen purely based on the economic criteria discussed above 
that describe the relevant managerial labor market.  Instead, we expect that managers will 
systematically select peer firms that are larger and have higher levels of compensation.   
 
2.4 The selection of firms for the peer group 
To explore how companies select compensation peers, we begin with an analysis 
of the characteristics of the firms included in the peer group.  Next, we examine the 
determinants of peer firm selection. 
 
2.4.1 Peer group characteristics 
Table 3 reports summary information on the size and composition of peer groups.  
The average (median) size of the peer group is around 16.4 (15) firms.  S&P 500 firms 
include more firms in their peer groups compared to firms not in the S&P 500, but the 
differences are small.  The majority of firms in the peer group come from the same 
industry.  Using the Fama and French (1997) 49-industry classification, we find that, on 
average (median), 63% (73%) of firms in the peer group are in the same industry as the 
sample firm.  Non-S&P 500 firms select more firms from the same industry compared to 




we examine the fraction of peer firms in the same industry that also has sales revenue 
between 50% and 200% of that of the sample firm.  Using this taxonomy, we find that, on 
average, 37% of peer firms are in the same industry-size classification.  Firms outside of 
the S&P 500 tend to have more of their peers chosen from the same industry-size group.  
The fact that S&P 500 firms are more likely to include peer firms outside of their 
industry-size group likely reflects the fact that these firms are among the largest in the 
economy and have few same-industry peers that are comparable in terms of size and 
compensation. 
As a basis for comparison, Faulkender and Yang (2010) report an average 
(median) size of peer groups to be 18.2 (16) which is slightly larger compared to our 
findings.12  Using two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, they find that 
the average (median) fraction of firms in the peer group that are in the same industry as 
the sample firm is 46% (44%).  Faulkender and Yang limit their sample to the S&P 900 
(S&P 500 plus the S&P midcap 400) and do not separately examine firms in different 
size groups.  Our results indicate the potential for distinct differences in peer group 
composition in large (S&P 500) and small (non-S&P 500) firms and suggest it is 
important to partition the data based on firm size. From here on we report results 
separately for these two groups of firms. 
 
2.4.2 The determinants of peer group composition 
Next, we estimate multivariate logit regressions to identify factors that firms use 
when selecting peers.  The set of potential peer firms includes all sample firms and all of 
                                                 
12The difference is driven by the fact that we limit our sample to those firms with complete data on all 





the peer firms disclosed by these firms.  The dependent variable is one if the firm is 
selected as a member of the compensation peer group at a particular firm and zero 
otherwise.  Based on the discussion in Section 2.3, the independent variables in the 
regression attempt to capture firm and industry traits related to supply and demand 
conditions in the managerial labor market.   
The independent variables include an indicator equal to one if the firm and the 
potential peer share the same Fama and French 49 industry classification.  To assess how 
firm size affects peer firm selection, we include two relative size variables.  The first is 
equal to the difference in log sales between the potential peer and the firm when this 
difference is positive, and is set equal to zero otherwise.  The second is equal to the 
difference in log sales between the potential peer and the firm, when the distance is 
negative, and zero otherwise.  This specification allows for asymmetry in how relative 
size affects the choice of peer firms.13  We form similar asymmetric measures for relative 
accounting performance and for market-to-book.  Allowing for asymmetry in the size and 
performance measures allows us to examine whether firms have a tendency to pick peer 
firms that are larger and with better performance.   
To capture commonalities across industries, we include the correlation of returns 
between the firm’s industry and the potential peer firm’s industry, where the correlation 
is measured using industry daily returns over the period 2004-2005.14  We also include a 
measure of whether the potential peer firm is in an industry with significant customer or 
supplier relationships with the firm’s own industry.  To measure supply chain 
                                                 
13Note that by using the difference in log sales, we are essentially examining differences in relative size in 
percentage terms, which is consistent with how firms describe peer group choice in the proxy statements. 





relationships, we use the commodity flow data from the input-output (I/O) tables 
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).15  For each firm and potential peer, 
we compute the fraction of output that the firm’s industry sells to the potential peer’s 
industry and the fraction of input that the firm’s industry purchases from the potential 
peer’s industry (Lemelin, 1982; and Fan and Lang, 2000).  To capture labor flows 
between industries, we compute the fraction of external hires in the firm’s industry that 
come from or leave for the potential peer firm’s industry.  We compute this measure 
using data from ExecuComp over the five-year period 2001 through 2005.16   
To proxy for other potential labor market linkages, we include a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm and the potential peer are both in the S&P 500 and a dummy 
equal to one if they are both not in the S&P 500.  We conjecture that S&P 500 firms are 
more likely to compete with other firms in the S&P 500 for executive talent.  We include 
a dummy equal to one if the firm and potential peer share the same credit rating to proxy 
for common capital market characteristics.  Finally, to capture commonalities in business 
complexity, we include dummy variables equal to one if both the firm and the potential 
peer report multiple business segments or multiple geographic segments.  The variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix.  Finally, the regression also includes firm fixed 
effects to account for the differences across firms in the unconditional probabilities of a 
firm being chosen as a peer firm that arise because the size of the peer group differs 
across firms.  The p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
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 The Web Site for the I/O data is http://www.bea.gov/industry/index.htm#benchmark_io. 
16To gather information on the firms/industries that the company either hired or lost talent to, we examined 
executive turnover over the last five years using the ExecuComp data.  Note that this measure does not 
capture labor movements across firms not included in the ExecuComp data, and is therefore a noisy 




reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and the marginal effects are 
reported in brackets.17 
 Focusing on model 1 in Table 4, all the coefficient estimates in the regression 
with the exception of the variables measuring the fraction of output (input) that the firm’s 
industry sells to (purchases from) the potential peer’s industry are statistically significant 
and nearly all of them have the expected sign.  Moreover, many of the effects are 
economically large.  For example, the results indicate that firms in the same industry are 
42% more likely to be chosen as peer firms, and when firms do go outside the industry, 
they tend to select firms from industries that have higher stock return correlations with 
their own industry.  With respect to firm size, the likelihood of a given firm being chosen 
as a peer declines as the absolute difference in log sales between the firm and the 
potential peer gets larger.  The effect, however, is asymmetric.  Conditional on the 
potential peer firm being larger (smaller) than the firm of interest, the marginal effect 
indicates that a one unit increase (decrease) in relative size decreases the probability of 
the firm being chosen as a peer by 18% (34%).18  Thus, although firms are less likely to 
choose firms as peers that are either larger or smaller than themselves, when they do 
choose peers that are different in size, they are more likely to choose larger firms as peers 
and less likely to choose smaller firms.  Similar results hold for the variables measuring 
relative performance and market-to-book.  Firms are more likely to choose peers that 
have better performance and higher market-to-book ratios compared to potential peers 
                                                 
17The marginal effects reported in brackets in Table 4 are calculated as the partial derivative of the event 
probability and are computed at the following values of covariates: indicator variables 3, 15, 17, 18, and 20 
set to one, indicator variables 16, 19, and 21 set to zero; all distance variables (1–2, and 5–10) set to zero; 
the remaining variables (4, 11–14) set at the respective means. 
18Note that for the coefficient α6, the independent variable (difference in log size between the peer and the 
firm conditional on the firm being larger than the potential peer) is negative, and thus, a positive coefficient 
estimate indicates that the probability that a particular firm is chosen as a peer is decreasing as the firm gets 




with lower relative performance.  Faulkender and Yang (2010) do not find evidence of 
asymmetry in the effects of size on peer firm selection.  The primary reason for this 
appears to be because they measure size using two indicator variables equal to one if the 
potential peer firm’s sales are between 50% and 100% or 100% and 200% of the sample 
firm’s sales.  We also find much less evidence of asymmetry in the effects of firm size if 
we use similar indicators instead of the continuous measures of relative size. 
 Consistent with labor market considerations, compensation peers are also more 
likely to come from industries which either hire or supply executive talent to the firm’s 
industry.  Other notable findings are that firms in the S&P 500 are more likely to choose 
peers that are also in the S&P 500.  Firms outside the S&P 500, however, are less likely 
to choose other non-S&P 500 firms as peers, all else equal.  Firms that report multiple 
business or geographic segments are more likely to choose other diversified firms, and 
firms are more likely to select peers that share the same credit rating. 
 To provide some preliminary evidence on whether, all else equal, firms favor 
potential peers with higher relative pay, in model 2 we add measures of relative pay equal 
to the difference in log total compensation between the potential peer and the firm.  
Similar to our investigation of relative size and performance, we allow for asymmetry in 
how relative pay affects the choice of peer firms.  The coefficient estimates indicate that 
firms do tend to favor potential peers with higher relative pay compared to those with 
lower relative pay, although the effects are not economically large.  For example, the 
marginal effect indicates that a one unit change in relative pay when the pay of the 
potential peer is above (below) the pay of the sample firm decreases the probability of the 




Finally, in unreported results we also find that the basic findings remain similar to 
those reported for the full sample when we separately estimate the regressions for S&P 
500 and non-S&P 500 firms.  One exception is that S&P 500 firms are more likely to 
include customer firms in their peer group, but are less likely to include suppliers.   
Overall, the analysis indicates that, for the most part, when firms pick 
compensation peers the goal is to identify other firms that share common labor market 
characteristics.  Nevertheless, the results also suggest some potentially opportunistic 
behavior in the selection of peers.  In particular, the asymmetric effects of relative firm 
size and firm performance indicate that firms tend to favor larger and better performing 
firms when choosing the peer group, while the asymmetric effects of relative pay indicate 
that firms also favor peers with higher compensation, all else equal.  In the next section 
we attempt to quantify the extent of these biases in peer group composition. 
 
2.5 Biases in peer group selection 
There are potentially three ways that peer groups can be manipulated to influence 
pay.  First, firms can target pay at higher percentiles than the median of the peer group 
pay distribution in order to benchmark pay against firms that have higher compensation.  
Second, consistent with the results from the logit analysis above, firms may 
systematically choose peer firms that are larger and have better performance, since 
compensation is correlated with firm size and performance.  Finally, holding other factors 






2.5.1 Pay targets 
 We gather data from proxy statements and report summary statistics on the pay 
targets used by firms in Table 5.  Firms sometimes report different targets for different 
components of pay and we focus on the targets for total pay.  As shown in Panel A, of the 
707 firms in our sample, 229 do not disclose their pay target.  For these firms, we assume 
that the pay target is the 50th percentile of the peer group pay distribution.  For the 478 
firms that disclose information on their pay targets, 103 report a range for target pay.  In 
these cases, we use the middle of the target range.  In nine cases, the bottom of the range 
is below the 50th percentile (for two firms the middle of the range is less than the 50th 
percentile and seven firms have the middle range at or above the 50th percentile).  In all 
other cases, the bottom of the range is at or above the 50th percentile.  The 375 remaining 
firms disclose a specific pay target, and of these firms, 268 (107) target at (above) the 
50th percentile of total pay.  Panel B of the table reports the mean pay targets as well as 
the fraction of firms with pay targets above the median.  As shown in the table, for S&P 
500 firms, 32% of the firms target total pay above the 50th percentile and the average pay 
target is the 56th percentile.  For non-S&P 500 firms, 27% of firms have pay targets 
above the 50th percentile, and the mean pay target is approximately the 55th percentile.  
The difference across the two groups in the level of the mean pay target is statistically 
significant, but the difference in the fraction of firms targeting above median pay is not 
statistically different across the groups.  
One reason that boards might choose a pay target above the median is because 
their firm is larger or has greater complexity than the median firm in the peer group.  For 




Committee decided that the appropriate comparative compensation target should be at the 
75th percentile of the peer group.”  To explore whether firm size or complexity explain 
the use of pay targets above the median, Panel C of Table 5 reports results from a logit 
regression where the dependent variable equals one if the target pay percentile is above 
the median and zero otherwise.  As proxies for size and complexity we include the 
natural log of sales revenue, an indicator equal to one if the firm has multiple business 
segments, an indicator equal to one if the firm has multiple geographic segments, and an 
indicator for S&P 500 firms.  As seen in the table, none of the coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant, which does not support the hypothesis that larger and more 
complex organizations are more likely to target pay above the median.  Instead, the 
results suggest that at least some firms might use high pay targets to inflate CEO pay. 
 
2.5.2. Size, performance, and pay biases 
Table 6 compares size, accounting performance, and compensation between the 
sample firms and their peers.  Using the peer groups corresponding to each sample firm, 
we compute the median value of the characteristic of interest.  The table then reports the 
median value of these medians across the sample firms.  We report results for S&P 500 
firms in Panel A and for non-S&P 500 firms in Panel B.  For S&P 500 firms, we find that 
peer groups appear to be constructed such that the median size (sales revenue) and 
accounting performance return on equity (ROA) of the peer firms are similar to those of 
the sample firms.  In terms of pay, the peer firms have total pay levels when measured in 
logs that are not statistically different from those of the sample firms.  In dollar terms, 




The median difference in dollar total compensation between the peer groups and the 
sample firms is -$161,000 (p-value < 0.05).19  Finally, S&P 500 firms tend to have a 
similar pay mix (salary and bonus /total pay) as the peer firms. 
In contrast, for non-S&P 500 firms, we find significant differences between the 
characteristics of the peer firms and those of the sample firms.  The median difference in 
terms of sales between the peer firms and the sample firms is about 25% (computed as 
exp(0.221)-1),20 or $172 million.  Similarly, the median difference in accounting 
performance between the peers and the sample firms is also positive, but is not 
statistically significant.  Consistent with these size and performance differences, the peer 
firms also have higher pay levels compared to the sample firms.  At the median, the total 
pay of peer firms is about 16.5% ($365,000) higher than that of the sample firms.  Part of 
the explanation for this could be that the selected peers have more equity-based pay than 
the sample firms.  For example, the median ratio of salary and bonus to total 
compensation is 49.7% for the sample firms compared to 44.9% for the peer firms.  To 
the extent that equity-based pay requires a higher risk premium, pay levels will be higher 
in the peer firms. The difference in the amount of equity-based pay, however, seems 
small relative to the differences in total compensation.  Overall, in comparison to S&P 
500 firms these differences in pay appear to be economically important. 
As noted in the prior subsection, about one-third of the firms in our sample use 
pay targets above the median.  To provide some evidence on how pay targets affect the 
pay comparisons with the peer group, we also compute the difference in total pay 
between the peer firm at the target pay percentile and the sample firm (results not 
                                                 
19Note that column 3 reports the median difference, which is not generally equal to the difference in 
medians in columns 1 and 2. 




tabulated).  For S&P 500 firms, the median difference in total pay between the target 
peers and the sample firms is 7.5% ($524,000), and for non-S&P 500 firms the difference 
is 27% ($542,000).  Both differences are statistically significant and provide evidence 
that setting pay targets above the median increases the bias in peer group pay as expected.  
Based on this analysis, S&P 500 firms appear to choose peers that are generally 
similar in terms of size, performance, and pay.  Even when pay is compared to the target 
pay percentile, the differences in pay are modest relative to the high pay levels in these 
firms.  In contrast, non-S&P 500 firms tend to pick peers that are systematically larger 
and that have considerably higher levels of compensation.  Firms outside the S&P 500 
appear to choose peer firms in a manner that could lead to unjustified pay increases.   
 
2.5.3. Peer group pay biases 
A final source of potential bias is picking peers that have high pay, holding 
constant differences in observable characteristics like size and performance.  Consistent 
with this possibility, the logit models in Table 4 show that firms tend to favor peers with 
higher relative pay, all else equal.  To quantify this effect, we use the coefficient 
estimates from model 1 in the logit regressions estimated in Table 4 to identify a matched 
peer group for each sample firm.  To identify the matched peers, we first compute 
propensity scores (i.e., the predicted probability of being chosen as a peer firm) from the 
logit model for each of the firms in the reported peer group.21  For each reported peer we 
then identify another potential peer firm that has the closest propensity score and denote 
this as the PSM-matched peer firm.  For each sample firm the set of potential peer firms 
includes all of the sample firms and their reported peers with the exception of the peer 
                                                 




being matched.  We then rank the actual and PSM-matched peers by total pay and 
compare the characteristics of the actual peers and the PSM-matched peers.  We report 
the comparisons for both the target pay-percentile and the median.22  In our analysis, we 
use the 50th percentile for firms that do not report a target percentile, and for firms that 
report a range of target pay percentiles we use the middle of the target range. 
Note that our methodology differs somewhat from the propensity score matching 
(PSM) used by Faulkender and Yang (2010), who exclude all of the actual peers from the 
set of potential peers when performing their PSM analysis.  For S&P 500 firms, we find 
that excluding the actual peer firms when selecting the matched peers results in PSM 
peers that are not well matched on size (the PSM peers are significantly smaller) and 
have much lower pay compared to both the sample firms and the actual peers.  Failure to 
obtain a good size match can produce differences in pay levels between the actual and 
matched peer groups that are driven by size differences rather than by differences in 
actual pay practices between the two groups.23   
The results of our PSM analysis are reported in Table 7.  For the S&P 500 firms, 
both at the 50th percentile and at the target pay percentile, the actual peers are about 8.2% 
($500 to $600 million) larger than the matched peers in terms of sales.  The accounting 
performance of the matched peers is not statistically distinguishable from that of the 
actual peer firms.  These results indicate that the matching technique does a good job of 
controlling for performance differences, but that some differences remain with respect to 
firm size.  Comparing the actual peers to the matched peers, there is some evidence that, 
                                                 
22Some firms have two firms at the target pay percentile (median).  In these cases we take the average value 
of the characteristic of interest.  In cases where we report log values, we take the log of the average value. 
23Faulkender and Yang  (2010) do not report size comparisons between the actual peers and their PSM 
peers.  When we conduct our analysis on only the S&P 900 firms excluding all actual peers in the PSM 




after controlling for observable characteristics, S&P 500 firms select higher paid peers.  
Total compensation is between 6% and 8% ($414,000 and $536,000) higher compared to 
the matched peers at the 50th percentile and the target pay percentile, respectively.  All of 
the differences are statistically significant.  While these results suggest that even after 
controlling for the biases in firm size and performance, S&P 500 firms tend to favor 
higher paid peers, we urge some caution in interpreting this result.  Given that the PSM-
matching technique does not completely eliminate size differences between the matched 
peers and the actual peers, any differences in compensation could be because of a failure 
to obtain a good size match. 
The results for the non-S&P 500 firm in Table 7 indicate that the differences in 
size and performance between the matched peers and the actual peers are not statistically 
significant indicating that the matching technique does a good job of controlling for these 
characteristics.  Comparing the pay levels of the actual peers and the matched peers, none 
of the differences in pay are statistically significant with the exception that the actual 
median peer firms have compensation that is $24,000 higher than the corresponding PSM 
peers (p-value < 0.10).  For non-S&P 500 firms, it appears that most of the bias in peer 
group pay comes from choosing systematically larger and better performing peers and 
through targeting above median pay, and not from selecting peers with higher pay, all 
else equal. 
 
2.5.4 Peer group biases and corporate governance 
We next examine whether the biases in peer group selection that we show above 




corporate governance that are often associated with managerial entrenchment: i) CEO 
tenure, ii) the fraction of the board that was hired after the CEO took office, and iii) the 
Gompers et al. (2003) measure of the strength of shareholder rights (GIM index).  If 
powerful CEOs are able to influence the selection of the compensation peer group, we 
expect firms with weaker governance—longer CEO tenure, more directors hired after the 
CEO took office, and a higher GIM index—to exhibit larger biases in peer group 
composition.   
We conduct basic univariate analysis to study the effects of governance on peer 
group bias and the results are presented in Table 8.  For each governance variable, we 
split firms into two groups based on the median value of the characteristic of interest.  
For each group we report the fraction of firms with pay targets above the 50th percentile, 
the difference in log sales between the median peer firm and the sample firm, and the 
difference in log total compensation between the medians of the actual and PSM-matched 
peer groups.  Results are reported separately for S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms in 
Panels A and B, respectively. 
Overall, there is no consistent evidence that weak governance is systematically 
associated with greater peer group biases.  For S&P 500 firms there is no evidence that 
any of the peer group bias measures are statistically different across firms with strong and 
weak governance when we measure governance based on either CEO tenure or the GIM 
index.  In contrast, firms with a high fraction of board members hired after the CEO are 
slightly more likely to have pay targets above the 50th percentile (p-value < 0.10).  For 
non-S&P 500 firms, those with longer CEO tenure are more likely to have above median 




however, firms with more entrenched managers as measured by the GIM index are less 
likely to have above median pay targets (p-value < 0.05).  None of the other measures of 
peer group bias are systematically correlated with the governance measures with the 
exception that the size bias is larger in firms where more board members are hired after 
the CEO (p-value < 0.10).   
 
2.5.5 Discussion 
To summarize, we find evidence of systematic biases in peer group composition 
that are consistent with peer groups being constructed in ways that inflate CEO pay.  For 
S&P 500 firms, the biases in peer group pay are relatively modest compared to the high 
pay levels in these firms.  In contrast, non-S&P 500 firms exhibit significant biases in 
peer group composition that allow managers to benchmark themselves with firms that 
have significantly higher pay.  In non-S&P 500 firms the source of bias largely comes 
from benchmarking against firms that are considerably larger and through targeting pay 
above the 50th percentile.  While there is some evidence that peer group biases are larger 
in firms with weak governance, the evidence is not consistent across different governance 
measures. 
The differences that we find between S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms are 
interesting in that much of the criticism of peer groups has been motivated by the pay of 
CEOs in large firms.  One possible explanation for the differences between S&P 500 
firms and the remaining firms in the sample is that S&P 500 firms are more visible and 
attract greater scrutiny compared to other firms, thus making it more difficult for CEOs to 




difficult to make significant adjustments to the benchmark in S&P 500 firms because 
these firms are already among the largest firms and have the most highly paid executives.   
 
2.6 The effect of peer groups on CEO pay 
In this section, we provide evidence on the extent to which CEOs actually benefit 
from the biases in peer group construction that we document above.  By benchmarking 
themselves against larger and more highly paid peers, CEOs can attempt to negotiate 
larger pay increases than can be justified by economic fundamentals.  If boards are aware 
of biases in the peer group composition, however, they may exercise discretion when 
determining pay levels that mitigates the effects of peer group bias.   
To examine this issue, our analysis follows Bizjak et al. (2008) and is designed to 
mimic the way in which firms use peer groups to benchmark compensation as described 
in Murphy (1999) and in proxy statements.  The results are reported in Table 9.  The 
dependent variable is the change in the log of total compensation between 2005 and 
2006.  Independent variables include log sales, change in log sales (2005 to 2006), and 
firm volatility.  Also included are measures of current (2006) and prior (2005) stock price 
and accounting performance.  Finally, we also include log pay in 2005 to account for any 
mean reversion in pay.  For example, if firms grant options every other year, the low pay 
in a given year with no option grants would be correlated with a large change in pay in 
the subsequent year.   
To provide a benchmark to assess the effect of peer group benchmarking on pay 
changes, we introduce a “naïve” peer group into the empirical model.  The naïve peer 




naïve peer group contains all firms in the same industry (Fama and French 49-industry 
groups) with sales revenues between 50% and 200% of those of the sample firm—which 
is a common criterion stated in proxy statements.24  For each firm we compute the 
difference in log compensation between the median of the naïve peer group and the 
sample firm based on compensation data in 2005, which is the compensation data that the 
board could observe when determining compensation for 2006.  This distance measure 
thus captures how much the manager is paid relative to the median firm within the same 
industry.  The coefficient estimate on this variable measures how the firm adjusts the 
manager’s compensation in 2006 as a function of the manager’s pay relative to the naïve 
peer group in 2005.   
In model 1, the change in pay is positively related to both the level and change in 
sales and to contemporaneous stock and accounting performance, although the coefficient 
estimates on the performance variables are not statistically significant.  The coefficient 
estimate on the peer group distance variable indicates that a manager with pay 1% below 
the naïve peer group median pay level receives an increase in pay that is approximately 
0.22% larger compared to a manager with pay equal to the naïve peer group median.  The 
adjusted R-squared of the regression is 34%.  In model 2, we substitute the difference in 
pay between the firm at the target pay percentile in the actual peer group and the sample 
firm for the pay difference measured relative to the naïve peer group.  The adjusted R-
squared of the regression increases to 36% and the coefficient estimate on the actual peer 
group distance measure indicates that a manager with pay 1% below the pay target 
receives an increase in pay that is approximately 0.31% larger compared to a manager 
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with pay equal to the pay target.  In model 3, we include both the naïve and actual peer 
group distance measures.  In this model, the actual peer group measure drives out most of 
the explanatory power of the naïve peer group measure.  Models 4 and 5 report similar 
results for subsamples of S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms, respectively.  Interestingly, 
the coefficient estimate on the distance measure is smaller for non-S&P 500 firms, which 
are the firms with the largest biases in peer group compensation.   
Overall, the results indicate that the use of peer group benchmarking is a 
significant determinant of CEO pay changes.  To the extent that peer group comparison 
pay is biased upward, managers will receive higher raises than they would otherwise.  
Nevertheless, the results suggest that boards exercise discretion and do not fully adjust 
compensation for differences in relative pay.  On average, the annual increase in 
compensation closes about one-third of the difference in pay between the CEO and the 
peer group.  The fact that the upward bias in peer group pay is most evident in non-S&P 
500 firms but that the adjustment coefficient is smaller in these firms is consistent with 
the idea that boards act to mitigate the effects of peer group biases and suggests that the 
overall benefit to these CEOs of inflating peer group pay is relatively small. 
 
2.7  Changes in peer group composition over time 
Lastly, we examine how the composition of peer groups has changed between 
2006 and 2007.  To explore this issue, we collect data on peer group composition for 
firms in our sample in fiscal year 2007 (2008 proxy year).  The data are available for 651 
firms in our original sample.  This analysis provides some insight into whether the new 




selection of peers.  If the new reporting requirements invite additional scrutiny regarding 
peer selection, we expect that when firms change the composition of their peer group, 
they will be more likely to pick new firms in the following year (2007) in a manner that 
reduces any size or compensation bias in peer selection from the previous year (2006).   
Table 10 provides evidence on the characteristics of the peer firms in 2006 and 
2007.  We break up the sample into quartiles based on the amount of similarity in peers in 
2006 and those chosen in 2007.  Panel A of Table 10 shows that overall, 81% of the peer 
firms remain constant between 2006 and 2007.  There is substantial variation, however, 
in changes in peer group composition across firms.  For the firms in the quartile with the 
most changes in the composition of the peer group, approximately 49% of the peer firms 
are either new or additional peer firms in 2007. 
Panels B and C compare the change in peer group biases across years between 
firms with the largest changes in peer group composition (the bottom quartile in Panel A) 
and the remaining firms.  The reported results focus on medians, but inferences based on 
means are similar.  In Panel B we compare biases in firm size, as measured by the 
difference in the log of sales revenue, between the median peer firm and the sample firm, 
and in Panel C, we compare the bias in total pay measured as the difference in the log of 
total compensation between the peer group median and the sample firm. 
Although none of the differences are statistically significant, two patterns in the 
data are notable.  First, firms with the largest amount of peer group change exhibit larger 
biases in both firm size and pay in 2006 compared to firms with few peer group changes.  
For example, the bias in size (pay) is 0.158 (0.141) in firms with large peer changes 




exhibit larger reductions in bias between 2006 and 2007.  Firms with the most peer group 
change reduce their size bias by about 2.4%, while firms with the least change in peer 
group composition reduce the size bias by 0.1%.  The reduction in pay bias is 4.3% for 
firms with large changes in peer group composition compared to an increase in pay bias 
of 0.6% for firms with small changes.25 
In general, the results are consistent with the view that the increased disclosure 
required by the new regulation has had some effect on the incentive of firms to 
opportunistically pick peer firms for compensation comparisons.  Firms making large 
changes to their peer groups in 2007 appear to do so in a manner that reduces the biases 
in size and compensation that were evident in 2006 (the first year in which the new 
regulations became effective).  An alternative hypothesis, however, is that the set of firms 
making large changes to their peer groups are those that have experienced recent changes 
in firm characteristics that have reduced comparability with the existing peer group.  In 
unreported results we find no evidence that this is the case.  Nevertheless, additional data 
will be needed to draw more definitive conclusions. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 The level of pay at the compensation peer group is one of the important inputs for 
determining executive pay.  Critics contend that powerful CEOs and co-opted boards 
opportunistically choose the benchmark peer group in a manner that inflates CEO pay.  
Moreover, given the prevalence of competitive benchmarking, they argue that this 
practice has led to an upward ratcheting of CEO pay over time.  Alternatively, there are 
                                                 
25
 We also examined whether firms systematically change their target pay levels.  We do not find evidence 




sound economic reasons for using peer group benchmarking.  Firms must compete in the 
labor market for managerial talent and it is hard to imagine how to set overall 
compensation without reference to supply and demand conditions in the managerial labor 
market.  Consequently, understanding how peer groups are formed is critical to 
understanding compensation practices. 
 We find that, on average peer, firms are chosen largely based on economic factors 
that reflect the managerial labor market in which the firms compete.  Compensation peer 
groups contain firms that are in the same industry, are similar in size and scope, and that 
reflect other commonalities related to labor market factors.  Nevertheless, we find that 
firms appear to exercise significant discretion in choosing peer firms.  We show that 
when firms deviate from the economic model of peer firm choice, they tend to pick larger 
firms and firms with higher CEO pay.  These biases in peer group selection are more 
evident in smaller, less visible firms where arguably management has more discretion in 
selecting the peer group.  Interestingly, we find little consistent evidence that the peer 
group biases we show are systematically related to corporate governance.  Despite the 
evidence of peer group biases that we find, boards appear to only partially adjust pay in 
response to differences in compensation between the comparison group and the CEO, 
suggesting that boards exercise discretion that mitigates the effects of peer group bias on 
pay increases.  Finally, we provide some evidence suggesting that the increased 
disclosure promulgated by the SEC regulation has reduced the biases in peer group 
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  All the numbers in parentheses refer to the annual Compustat item number. Other data sources are given in the variable 
definition.  
Variable names Variable definition and data sources 
Firm/peer characteristics: 
Sales revenue Sales (12) 
Log of sales revenue Log(Sales revenue) 
Total assets Total assets (6) 
ROA (%) Return on assets = 100*Operating income after depreciation (178)/ book assets (6) 
Market-to-book Market-to-book (MTB) = [market equity + total debt + preferred stock liquidating value (10) 
 – deferred taxes and investment tax credits (35)]/ book assets (6) 
where Market equity = Stock price (199) * Shares outstanding (25) 
                Total debt = Long term debt (9) + Short term debt (34) 
Salary and bonus Salary + Bonus, ExecuComp 
Total compensation Total compensation = (Salary + Bonus + Other annual + Restricted stock grants + LTIP payouts + 
All other + Value of options granted for 2005 fiscal year; and Salary + Bonus+ Non-equity incentive 
plan compensation + Value of options granted + Grant-date fair value of stock awards + Deferred 
compensation earnings reported as compensation + Other compensation for 2006 fiscal year), 
ExecuComp 
CEO ownership (%) CEO ownership = 100*(shrown_tot/1000)/shrsout, ExecuComp 
Board size Number of directors, IRRC Directors 
Fraction of the board that is independent Fraction of board that is independent directors, IRRC Directors 
CEO tenure CEO tenure, ExecuComp 
GIM index Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003) index, IRRC Governance 




Table 1 (continued)  
Firm/peer characteristics (continued): 
Total shareholder return One-year total return to shareholders in percentage (dividends reinvested), ExecuComp 
Stock price volatility 
 
Volatility (60 month) used to calculate Black-Scholes values, ExecuComp 
Peer group variables: 
Fraction of peers in the same Fama-French 
industry 
Fama and French (1997) 49-industry classification 
Fraction of peers in the industry-size group A peer is considered in the sample firm’s industry-size group if the peer is in the sample firm’s 
industry and has sales between 0.5 to 2.0 times that of the sample firm’s sales 
Change in log(Total compensation ) Log(Total compensation 2006) – Log(Total compensation 2005) 
Difference in log compensation between Naïve 
peer group and the firm 
Log(Naïve peer group median compensation 2005) – Log(Firm compensation 2005) 
Difference in log compensation between Actual 
peer group and the firm 




Correlation of firm’s industry return and 
potential peer’s industry return 
Correlations were calculated using 2004–2005 industry daily return. Data are from Ken French’s 
website. 
Customer/Supplier relation Data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2002 Benchmark Input Output account, ‘USE’ table. 
Executive transfers Turnover data from ExecuComp, 2001–2005.  
Credit market characteristics Firm credit rating is determined based on Compustat data 280 ‘S&P LT Domestic Issuer Credit 
Rating.’ Credit rating has four possible values: ‘investment grade’ if data280 in [2,12], ‘junk’ if 
data280 in [13,23], ‘default’ if data280 in [27,29], and ‘unrated’ if data280 is missing. 
Product diversification and Market 
diversification 
















  Summary statistics of i) firms reporting peer groups and firms that did not report 
peer groups and ii) firms that report peers where we have sales and compensation data on 
all peers and firms that report peers where we do not have either sales or compensation 
data for all peers.  Out of 1,333 ExecuComp 2006 fiscal year firms that reported under 
the new SEC rule (roughly, firms that have fiscal-year end from December 2006 to May 
2007), 1,178 have annual proxy statements available.  808 firms reported peer groups and 
370 did not.  The requirements that sample firms have non-zero CEO compensation in 
both 2005 and 2006 fiscal years reduce the sample to 798 reporting firms and 357 non-
reporting firms.  Out of 798 firms, 707 have all peers with non-missing compensation and 
sales revenue; and 91 have some peers with missing compensation or sales revenue.  The 
707 reporting firms together report 11,570 peers (2,630 distinct peers).  The table reports 
data for 2005 fiscal year.  The union of the 707 sample firms and their 2,630 chosen peers 
has 2,678 firms.  ROA and market-to-book are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
of the distribution of the sample union.  Variable definitions are provided in table 1. ***, 
**












Comparison of firms with full data on all peers with firms 
without full data on all peers 
 Firms reporting peers 
N=707 
Firm not reporting peers 
N=357 
Firms with full peer data 
N=707 
Firms without full peer data 
N=91 
 Median Median Median Median 
Financial characteristics     
Sales ($ million) 2028 1006*** 2028 2559 
Total assets ($ million) 3080 1269*** 3080 3589 
ROA (%) 8.08 8.01 8.08 8.36 
     
Compensation     
Salary & bonus ($ 000s) 1538 1009*** 1538 1809** 
Salary & bonus/Sales 0.76 1.04*** 0.76 0.84 
Total compensation ($ 000s) 3880 2326*** 3880 4324** 
Total compensation/Sales 1.85 2.15*** 1.85 1.81 
Pay mix (salary & bonus/total 
compensation) 
0.42 0.49*** 0.42 0.41 
     
Governance characteristics     
CEO ownership (%) 0.91 1.25*** 0.91 0.97 
Board size 9 9***, a 9 9 
Fraction of the board that is 
independent 
0.75 0.70*** 0.75 0.77 
CEO tenure 5.24 6.16* 5.24 5.98 
GIM index 9 9*, b 9 9 
Fraction of the board hired 
during the CEO’s tenure 
0.50 0.45 0.50 0.50 
 
a: Firms reporting peer groups have larger rank-sum value.  The means of the two groups are 9.449 and 8.914, and significant at 1%. 





Statistics on the size and composition of peer groups. 
  This table present evidence on peer group size and 45omposition.  The sample 
covers ExecuComp 2006 fiscal year firms that report under the new SEC rule (roughly, 
firms that have fiscal-year end in December 2006 and later) and that report the use of 
peer groups in determining executive compensation and have all peers with non-missing 
compensation and sales.  Peer group data were hand-collected from corporate proxy 
statements.  In identifying industry, we use the Fama-French 49-industry classification. A 
peer is considered in the sample firm’s industry-size group if the peer is in the sample 
firm’s industry and has sales between 0.5 to 2.0 times that of the sample firm’s sales. The 








Number of firms 
in peer group 
Fraction of peers 
in the same 
industry 
Fraction of peers 




All firms in the 
sample 
 






S&P 500 firms 
 



















  Logit regressions of the factors that determine the characteristics of the firms that 
are contained in the compensation peer group. The dependent variable is one if a 
potential peer is chosen as a peer by the sample firm and zero otherwise.  The sample for 
the analysis consists of 707 firms with complete data on all peers.  The set of potential 
peers includes the union of all sample firms and their chosen peers.a  The marginal effect 
is defined as the partial derivative of the event probability.b p-Values are reported in 
parentheses and marginal effects are reported in brackets. 
 
  Dependent variable is one if a potential peer is 
chosen as a peer by the sample firm and zero 
otherwise 
  (1) (2) 




 Compensation measure:   
α1 Log peer total pay – Log firm total pay 






α2 Log peer total pay – Log firm total pay 






 Industry variables:   
α3 Dummy equal to one if both firm and peer 







α4 Correlation of firm’s industry return and 







 Sales and performance measures:   
α5 Log peer sales – Log firm sales when Firm 







α6 Log peer sales – Log firm sales when Firm 








α7 Peer ROA – Firm ROA when Firm ROA < 








α8 Peer ROA – Firm ROA when Firm ROA > 








α9 Peer MTB – Firm MTB when Firm MTB 








α10 Peer MTB – Firm MTB when Firm MTB 












Table 4 (continued) 
  Dependent variable is one if a potential peer is 
chosen as a peer by the sample firm and zero 
otherwise 
  (1) (2) 
 Customer or supplier relation:   
α11 Fraction of output (in dollars) that firm’s 







α12 Fraction of input (in dollars) that firm’s 








    
 Executive transfers:   
α13 Fraction of external hires for CEO positions 
over the last 5 years that firm’s industry 







α14 Fraction of executive talent loss that 
potential peer’s industry hired from firm’s 








S&P 500 firms: 
  
α15 Dummy equal to one if both firm and peer 







α16 Dummy equal to one if both firm and peer 







 Credit market characteristics:   
α17 Dummy equal to one if both firm and peer 







 Product and market diversification:   
α18 Dummy equal to one if both firm and peer 







α19 Dummy equal to one if both firm and peer 








 20 Dummy equal to one if both firm and peer 








 21 Dummy equal to one if both firm and peer 







    
 Fixed effects Yes Yes 
 Number of observations 707*2677 707*2677 
 Number of event occurs 11570 11570 
 McFadden’s pseudo R2 0.395 0.397 
a
 Each sample firm is excluded from its own set of potential peers. 
b
 Marginal effects are computed at the following values of covariates: dummies 3, 15, 17, 18, and 20 set to 
one; dummies 16, 19, and 21 set to zero; all distance variables (1–2, 5–10) set to zero; the remaining 
















Peer group pay target percentiles 
  Summary statistics of peer group pay target percentiles along with a logit regression 
of firm characteristics associated with pay targets above the median.  Panels A and B 
report summary statistics of the target percentiles.  Panel C reports results from the logit 
regression.  Target percentiles are hand-collected from proxy statements.  When a target 
range is specified, the middle of the range is used.  For 229 firms that do not explicitly 
specify targets, the median is used.  For the logit regression, the dependent variable is one 
if the pay target is above the median and zero otherwise.  The independent variables 
include the log of sales revenue in the 2005 fiscal year, a dummy equal to one for S&P 
500 firms, a dummy equal to one if the firm reports more than one business segment, and 
a dummy equal to one if the firm reports more than one geographical location.  For the 
logit regressions, the sample consists of 707 firms that reported peer groups in their 2006 
proxy statement where we have full data on sales and compensation for all peer firms.   
***, **, And * represent differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. T-Test is used.  For 










Firms where target 






a precise target 
Firms specifying 
a target equal to 
median 
      
S&P 500 
 
259 64 34 161 110 
Non-S&P 500 
 
448 165 69 214 158 
 











than median Min Max 
       
S&P 500 
 
259 0.562***, b 0.320 0.000 0.5 0.9 
Non-S&P 500 
 
448 0.547***, b 0.268 0.004 0.375 0.9 
p-Value for difference between 
S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 
firms 
 (0.040) (0.143) (0.158)   
 
Panel C: Logit regression 
 Intercept Log sales 
revenue 
2005 
Dummy = 1 for 
S&P 500 firms 
Dummy = 1 for 
Multiple business 
segments 
























 Marginal effects are calculated as the partial derivatives of the event probability at the covariate means. 





Summary statistics on peer firms. 
  Summary statistics for firm size, performance, and compensation for firms and their 
reported compensation peers.  Panel A (B) reports medians across S&P 500 (non-S&P 
500) sample firms.  Firm size is measured by sales revenue and firm performance is 
ROA.  Compensation includes all forms of pay such as salary and bonus, options, 
restricted stock awards, etc.  The Wilcoxon signed rank test is used in testing the 
differences in column 3.  ***, **, And * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
confidence levels.  Data are for 2005 fiscal year and consist of 707 firms that reported 
peer groups in their 2006 proxy statement where we have full data on sales and 
compensation for all peer firms. 
 
Panel A: S&P 500 (259 firms)  
 Sample firm 
 
(1) 
Peer group median 
 
(2) 
Peer group median 
minus sample firm 
(3) 
Sales (log) 8.977 9.000 -0.016 
Sales ($ millions) 7919 8104 -92 
ROA (%) 9.216 10.366 0.121 
Total compensation (log) 8.955 8.976 -0.035 
Total compensation ($ 000s) 7748 7914 -161** 
Pay mix (salary & bonus/total 
compensation) 0.344 0.345 0.010 
 
 
Panel B: Non-S&P 500 (448 firms)  
 Sample firm 
 
(1) 
Peer group median 
 
(2) 
Peer group median 
minus sample firm 
(3) 
Sales (log) 6.907 7.235 0.221*** 
Sales ($ millions) 999 1388 172*** 
ROA (%) 7.774 9.016 0.164 
Total compensation (log) 7.836 8.043 0.153*** 
Total compensation ($ 000s) 2530 3113 365*** 
Pay mix (salary & bonus/total 






Propensity score matching peers and real peer group comparison. 
  Comparison of characteristics between the real peer group target (median) peers and 
the propensity score matched (PSM) peer group target (median) peers.  The coefficient 
estimates from the logit regression specification 1 in Table 3 are used to estimate the 
predicted probability (propensity score) for every potential peer.  For each real peer 
group, a PSM peer group is formed by selecting potential peers that have the closest 
propensity score to the individual peers in the real peer group.  Matching is done without 
replacement.  Target peer(s) are defined for each peer group based on total compensation 
and the target pay percentile specified by the sample firms.a  Medians across sample 
firms are reported.  For test statistics the Wilcoxon signed rank test is used.  ***, **, And 
* represent differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 S&P 500 Non-S&P 500 
















Sales (log) 0.079 0.079** 0.000 0.005 
Sales ($ millions) 591*** 529*** 0 2 
ROA (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total compensation (log) 0.080*** 0.059*** 0.007 0.004 
Total compensation  
($ 000s) 536*** 414*** 24* 15 
 
a
 Depending on peer group size and target percentile specified, some peer groups have two target(median) 
















Corporate governance and peer group selection. 
  The effect of corporate governance on the peer group target pay percentile, size bias, 
and compensation bias.  Panel A reports the results for S&P 500 firms and Panel B for 
non-S&P 500 firms.  The size bias is the difference in log sales between the peer group 
median and the sample firm. Compensation bias is the difference in log total 
compensation between the target peer (median peer) and the propensity score matched 
target (median) peer.  Three governance attributes are analyzed: CEO tenure, the fraction 
of the board hired after the CEO, and the GIM index.  The sample consists of 707 firms 
that reported peer groups in their 2006 proxy statement where we have full data on sales 
and compensation for all peer firms.  Values for all the governance variables are 
partitioned above and below median values within the sample of 707 firms reporting 
peers.  Median values are then reported for each subsample.  The Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
is used to compare the two subsamples.  ***, **, And * represent differences at the 1%, 





Panel A: S&P 500 
 CEO tenure Fraction of board hired after CEO GIM index 


















       
Fraction of firms with target 
higher than median 0.333 0.315 0.371 0.272*  0.292 0.346 
Log of peer group median size 
minus log firm size  0.025 -0.032 -0.021 -0.012 0.001 -0.032 
Log of real target peer 
compensation  minus log of PSM 
target peer  compensation 
0.069 0.040 0.085 0.023 0.024 0.081 
Log of real median peer 
compensation minus log of PSM 
median peer compensation 
0.080 0.081 0.126 0.031 0.043 0.098 
 
Panel B: Non-S&P 500 
 CEO tenure Fraction of board hired after CEO GIM index 


















       
Fraction of firms with target 
higher than median 0.319 0.221** 0.283 0.246 0.220 0.318** 
Log of peer group median size 
minus log firm size  0.203 0.221 0.276 0.191* 0.239 0.192 
Log of real target peer 
compensation  minus log of PSM 
target peer  compensation 
0.003 0 0.028 -0.009 0.049 0 
Log of real median peer 
compensation minus log of PSM 
median peer compensation 
























Peer groups and pay changes. 
  The effect of peer group compensation on changes in pay.  The dependent variable in 
all specifications is the change in the log of total compensation from 2005 to 2006.  
Independent variables include a measure of the distance in the firm’s pay from peer group 
benchmarks.  Two different benchmarks—the naïve and the actual—are used. The naïve 
benchmark is the median pay of a peer group that consists of all firms in the same Fama-
French industry that have sales revenue between 0.5 and 2.0 times that of the sample firm.  
All firms that have compensation available—ExecuComp firms and hand-collected 
firms—are used in construction of the naïve peer groups.  The actual benchmark is 
constructed as target pay percentile of the actual peer group reported in the proxy 
statement.  Other independent variables include the lagged log of sales revenue, change in 
the log of sales revenue, ROA, prior year ROA, stock return, prior year stock return, stock 































Difference in log compensation 






(0.095)   
Difference in log compensation 












      










      
































       










       










       










      










      
Adjusted R-squared 0.336 0.360 0.362 0.337 0.406 





Changes in peer group characteristics. 
  Analysis of changes in peer group characteristics between 2006 and 2007.  Firms are 
sorted into quartiles based on the frequency of changes in the composition of the peer 
group between years.  Panel A reports the fraction of peer groups that remain the same 
between 2006 and 2007, broken down by quartiles.  The first quartile represents the 
group with the greatest change in peer group composition between years while the fourth 
quartile represents the group with the least change.  In Panels B and C, Group 1 
represents the quartile with the greatest number of replacements or additions to the peer 
group between years.  Group 2 represents the remaining three quartiles.  Panel B (C) 
reports the differences and changes in differences of the peer group median sales revenue 
(total compensation) and that of the sample firm.  Medians are reported in Panels B and 
C.  ***, **, And * represent differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (Wilcoxon signed 




Panel A: Fraction of the peer group that remains the same from 2006 to 2007 
Mean fraction of similar peers between 06 and 07 




0.511 0.814 0.923 0.998 
 
 
Panel B: Median of differences and change in differences between peer group median sales revenue and 
sample firm sales revenue (log) 
Group Obs Median of sales 
difference in 2006 
Median of sales 
difference in 2007 
Median of change in 
sales differences 
1 165 0.158*** 0.140*** -0.024 
2 486 0.114*** 0.122*** -0.001 
p-Value  (0.159) (0.792) (0.270) 
 
 
Panel C: Median of differences and change in differences between peer group median total compensation 
and sample firm total compensation (log) 
Group Obs Median of compensation 
difference in 06 
Median of compensation 
difference in 07 
Median of change in 
compensation differences 
 165 0.141** 0.131* -0.043 
 486 0.041* 0.026* 0.006 







DIVIDEND YIELDS AND STOCK RETURNS: EVIDENCE FROM AN 
ECONOMY WITHOUT TAXES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A long standing question in financial economics is whether investor level taxes 
are reflected in asset prices.  One view is that the tax payments on dividends and capital 
gains are capitalized into stock prices resulting in a negative relationship between equity 
valuations and the tax burden imposed on investors.  Under this view an increase in the 
tax burden lowers equity valuations resulting in higher before-tax expected returns that 
compensate investors for the additional taxes paid on their holdings.  A competing view, 
however, is that the effect of taxes on equity prices is negligible.  Miller and Scholes 
(1978) argue that investment taxes can largely be avoided in perfect capital markets, thus 
making the marginal investor tax exempt.  Alternatively, the effect of taxes on equity 
prices and returns may also be small if investors sort themselves into clienteles such that 
tax exempt agents hold high tax securities and taxable agents hold low tax securities. 
Recently, Sialm (2009) provides both time-series and cross-sectional evidence 
consistent with the tax capitalization hypothesis using data on the variation in the tax 
burden on U.S. equity securities.  Indeed, Sialm’s estimates suggest that taxes are 




is associated with approximately a 1% increase in the before-tax rate of return.  There 
are, however, reasons to question these findings.  A large fraction of the variation in the 
tax burden variable used by Sialm comes from variation in the dividend yield, and prior 
studies on U.S. data (e.g., Naranjo, Nimalendren, and Ryngaert, 1998) find that dividend 
yields are positively related to returns in a manner similar to the tax burden.  More 
importantly, Naranjo et al. (1998) argue that the magnitude of the effect of the dividend 
yield on returns is too large to be consistent with tax effects, and instead suggest that the 
relationship between dividend yields and returns is likely the result of omitted risk factors 
or other characteristics related to stock returns.  The fact that dividend yields (which are a 
key input to the tax measure in Sialm) are highly correlated with the tax burden makes it 
difficult to disentangle tax effects from other possible explanations for the correlation 
between returns and the tax burden variable. 
In this paper we propose a different approach.  The Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region does not levy tax on either dividend income or capital gains and 
thus provides a unique economic setting in which to examine the tax capitalization 
hypothesis.  We document a robust positive relation between the dividend yield and stock 
returns in the Hong Kong market that is very similar in magnitude to the effect 
documented by Sialm in the U.S. market.  In cross-sectional tests, the coefficient 
estimates associated with the effect of the dividend yield on stock returns are 1.266 and 
1.262 when returns are risk-adjusted using CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model, 
respectively.26  These estimates indicate that a one percent difference in dividend yields is 
associated with slightly higher than one percent difference in risk-adjusted return.  In 
addition to the cross-sectional results, we also provide time-series evidence. In the Hong 
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Kong market, there is a robust negative relation between the aggregate dividend yield and 
aggregate equity valuations. In other words, during times when the dividend yield is high 
(low), aggregate equity values tend to be low (high).  Similar to the findings from the 
cross-sectional tests, the effect of the dividend yield on aggregate valuations in Hong 
Kong is comparable to that of the effect of the tax yield in the U.S. documented in Sialm 
(2009).  In the case of Hong Kong, however, the relationship between dividend yields 
and returns (valuations) cannot be due to tax effects as there are no investor level taxes on 
dividends or capital gains. 
Consistent with the views expressed in Naranjo et al. (1998), our paper suggests 
that there are nontax reasons that cause the relationship between dividend yields and 
returns.  Our findings do not necessarily invalidate the Brennan (1970) after-tax CAPM, 
nor do they completely rule out taxes as one of the drivers of the dividend yield effect.  
Our contribution is to illustrate the difficulty of conducting a powerful test of the tax 
capitalization hypothesis in practice and to urge caution in interpreting the dividend yield 
effect as evidence in support of the tax capitalization hypothesis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 briefly reviews 
the related literature.  Section 3.3 discusses important features of Hong Kong taxation for 
the issue being studied.  Section 3.4 presents cross-sectional evidence.  Section 3.5 








3.2 Literature review 
There is an extensive literature examining the relationship between taxes and 
equity prices.27  In the U.S., dividend income has typically been taxed at a higher rate 
than capital gains income.  Based on this observation, Brennan (1970) derives an after tax 
version of the capital asset pricing model in which the risk adjusted returns on stocks are 
positively related to the stock’s dividend yield.  In Brennan’s model, the extra return 
earned on stocks with high dividend yields offset the increased taxes that investors must 
pay to hold these assets.  Black and Scholes (1974) test the Brennan model using data on 
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange between 1926 and 1966.  They proxy for 
the expected dividend yield in the current year, they use the ratio between dividends paid 
during the prior year and the stock price at the end of the previous year.  Black and 
Scholes (1974) find no relationship between their measure of the expected dividend yield 
and risk-adjusted stock returns, which is inconsistent with the Brennan model.  Miller and 
Scholes (1978) argue that one should not expect to find a large effect of taxes on asset 
prices, because the marginal investor is likely to be tax exempt.  In contrast to this view, 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) employ a different measure of the dividend yield 
and find strong evidence in favor of the tax hypothesis.  Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
classify dividend paying stocks as having a positive dividend yield only during months in 
which the stock goes ex-dividend. In the ex-dividend months the expected dividend yield 
is calculated as Dt/Pt-1 (the announced dividend divided to the price at the beginning of 
the month). In months other than ex-dividend months, stocks are classified as having zero 
dividend yield.  Using this measure of the dividend yield, they find a positive relationship 
                                                 




between dividend yields and risk adjusted returns that they interpret as being consistent 
with tax effects. 
Eades, Hess, and Kim (1994) and Kalay and Michaely (2000) provide a 
reconciliation of the conflicting results in Black and Scholes (1974) and Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979) results.  Both set of authors find that stocks that pay dividends 
exhibit higher returns during the ex-dividend month, but do not have higher returns in 
other months.  More importantly, the high returns in ex-dividend months are unrelated to 
the magnitude of the dividend yield.  As a result of using a short-term dividend yield 
definition, the experiment in Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) uncovers time-series 
variation in returns rather than cross-sectional return variation as a function of the 
dividend yield.  This pattern in returns is not in favor of the tax hypothesis. 
More recently, Naranjo, Nimalendran and Ryngaert (1998) use a measure of the 
long-term dividend yield in a carefully selected sample of  NYSE stocks. Naranjo et al. 
(1998) find a significant positive relationship between dividend yields and returns. As 
stated in their paper, however, the relation is difficult to be explained by the tax 
hypothesis. First, the coefficient estimates on the dividend yield variables are too large to 
be consistent with tax effects.  Second, the relationship between dividend yields and 
returns is not present in large firms.  Finally, they find no evidence that the magnitude of 
the effect varies across different tax regimes.   
In contrast, Sialm (2009) directly computes a measure of the total tax burden 
imposed on investors from both capital gains and dividend income.  Using a long sample 
period, Sialm provides both time-series and cross-sectional evidence of a robust negative 




market.  Based on this evidence Sialm concludes in favor of the tax capitalization 
hypothesis. 
Overall, the evidence of whether taxes affect asset prices is mixed.  It is difficult 
to construct a definitive test of the tax hypothesis because of the possibility that the 
dividend yield might proxy for omitted risk factors or other characteristics related to 
returns that are unrelated to tax effects.  Sialm attempts to measure the tax burden on 
securities directly.  Interpreting the results remains difficult however, as one of the 
primary inputs to the computation of the tax burden is the dividend yield.  We provide 
new evidence on whether taxes affect equity valuations using data from Hong Kong, an 
economy where there is no tax disadvantage of dividend income relative to capital gains.  
If taxes are the sole driver of the dividend yield effect then there should be no relation 
between dividend yields and returns in Hong Kong data.  The most closely related paper 
to ours is Lim (1996) who uses Hong Kong data from October 1983 to December 1991 to 
investigate the tax hypothesis.  The coefficient estimate on the dividend yield variable is 
not significantly different from zero, which supports the tax hypothesis.  Lim’s results are 
difficult to interpret however.  First, the sample period is very short, which limits the 
power of the test.  Second, Lim includes in the sample only stocks that go ex-dividend in 
any particular month and make dividend announcement in the prior month, and thus one 
can only interpret Lim’s result as documenting that there is no relation between dividend 
yields and returns during ex-dividend months.  Moreover, the short-term dividend yield 
definition employed by Lim is inconsistent with the long-term measures of the dividend 
yield that are used in most other recent studies.  Finally, it is expensive to buy and sell 




price on each stock transaction (Frank and Jagannathan, 1998).  This suggests that 
investors in Hong Kong stocks care about long-term returns, and that to test the tax 
hypothesis one needs to investigate returns across longer holding periods, not just the ex-
dividend month. 
 
3.3 Taxation in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong has one of the simplest tax regimes among the developed economies.  
It adopts a territorial-source principle of taxation; i.e. only Hong Kong sourced incomes 
are taxed.  Furthermore, only specified types of incomes are taxed – namely, profits, 
salaries and properties: profits from trade or business are subject to a profits tax; income 
from employment is subject to a salaries tax; and income from property is subject to a 
property tax.28 
Profits arising from the sale of capital assets are excluded from assessable profits.  
In addition, dividends received from a corporation that is subject to the Hong Kong 
Profits Tax are tax-exempt.  Thus, investors who invest in Hong Kong common stocks 
face neither taxes on capital gain nor taxes on dividend income.  The works of Frank and 
Jagannathan (1998) and Lim (1996) are among the prior research that exploits this unique 
feature of Hong Kong market. 
 Although there is no capital-gains tax, it should be noted that if financial assets 
are acquired for the purpose of short-term profit-taking then the gain on disposal of such 
assets is taxable.  The fact that some investors might be taxed on stock price appreciation 
makes capital gains less tax-desirable than dividend income in Hong Kong.  In this case, 
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the tax capitalization hypothesis predicts that the relationship between dividend yields 
and stock returns would be negative, which is opposite to our finding.  This strengthens 
our conclusion that there are omitted factors that drive the positive yield-return 
relationship. 
 
3.4 Cross-sectional evidence 
3.4.1 Data and summary statistics 
Our sample consists of all Hong Kong stocks covered by DataStream.29  Only the 
securities that have the type ‘EQ’ (equity) are included in the sample. The sample starts 
in January 1973, the first available month, and ends in December 2005. We download 
monthly data on prices, dividends, returns, volume, and shares outstanding.  
Turnover is defined as number of shares traded divided by the number of share 
outstanding.  Monthly turnover is the sum of the daily turnover of all trading days in the 
months.  Firms that have one or more of the following are excluded: average monthly 
turnover less than 0.73% (approximately the 5th percentile), percentage of no-trade days 
greater than 50%, six or greater continuous months of no-trade.  These screens are used 
to ensure that our results are not driven by small, illiquid stocks.  Nevertheless, the results 
are similar when we don’t exclude any firms or employ other reasonable screens to 
exclude illiquid stocks. 
The stock return for a given month is calculated based on the Return Index. As 
defined by DataStream, the Return Index shows the growth in value of a stock assuming 
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that dividends are reinvested in the same stock. Thus return during month t can be 
computed as (RIi,t/RIi,(t-1) – 1), where RIi,t and RIi,(t-1) are the levels of the Return Index at 
the end of month t and t-1. Returns are winzorized at 1st and 99th percentiles to ensure the 
results are not driven by outliers.  We report results using returns in denominated U.S. 
dollars rather than returns in Hong Kong dollar. Excess returns are defined as the 
difference between realized returns and returns on 1-month US Treasury-bills.30 
Datastream provides a measure of the dividend yield for each security.  According 
to Datastream, the dividend yield is calculated as the ratio of anticipated amounts of 
dividends during the next twelve months to current stock prices. For the Hong Kong 
market Datastream computes the anticipated dividend amount as the amount of dividends 
paid during the prior twelve months excluding special and one-off dividends.31  This 
measure of the dividend yield is similar to the definition of the long-term dividend yield 
used by Keim (1985) Naranjo, Nimalendren, and Ryngaert (1998).  This definition of the 
dividend yield differs slightly from the dividend yield defined in Sialm (2009).  The 
Datastream dividend yield is computed by scaling dividends by the current stock price, 
whereas the dividend yield used by Sialm scales by the one-year lagged stock price.  
Following Sialm, we adjust the Datastream dividend yield using the current and lagged 
one-year stock price level to create a measure of the dividend yield that is identical to that 
used by Sialm.  We winsorize the adjusted dividend yield at 99th percentile. 
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equal to one for every month and returns in both currencies would be identical.  Over the period from 
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A final issue that arises is that DataStream continues reporting the last valid data 
for inactive firms even after they become inactive. For example, if a company became 
inactive in November 2005 and the last valid data are for October 2005 then DataStream 
keeps reporting the October 2005 data for all months afterward.  Following the 
recommendation of Ince and Porter (2006) we remove all the padded monthly zero-return 
series at the end of the sample. Using this procedure, it is possible that a few observations 
that have valid zero returns are unintentionally deleted, but any omissions appear minor.  
Our final sample consists of 837 firms with 109,316 firm-month observations. 
Figure 1 and Table 11 display the number of stocks in the sample at end of June 
of each year. It can be seen that the number of firms has increased significantly over the 
sample period.  The number of firms increases from 42 in June 1974 to 638 in June 2005. 
From 1988 to 1989, the number of firms almost doubled from 93 to 172. The numbers of 
stocks that have positive and zero dividend yields are also reported. In June 1974, only 1 
out of 42 firms did not pay dividends.  In June 2005, 236 out of 638 firms did not pay 
dividends.  Figure 2 plots the aggregate dividend yield trend in the Hong Kong market 
during the sample period, where dividend yields are calculated in June of each year.  The 
figure shows that there is considerable variation in the average dividend yield over time.  
The mean dividend yield is highest at 7.13% in 1985 and lowest at 2.77% in 2000. 
 
3.4.2 Methodology and empirical results 
The basis for tests of tax effects on equity returns is the version of the capital asset 




return on a stock to the stock’s systematic or market risk and to the stock’s dividend yield 
as follows:  
titFtititFti rdyaaarrE ,,,3,21,, )()( εβ +−++=−         (1) 
where E is the expectation operator, ri,t is the rate of return on stock i during period t, βi,t 
is its systematic risk as captured by the market beta of the stock, di,t is the expected 
dividend yield, and rF,t is the risk-free rate. In the original model a3 = (Td-Tg)/(1-Tg) 
where Td and Tg are the tax rates on dividend income and capital gains of the 
representative investor.  Coefficient a3 can be interpreted as investors’ tax disadvantage 
of receiving dividend income relative to capital gain income. Equation (1) predicts stocks 
that have higher dividend yields should provide higher before-tax risk-adjusted returns to 
compensate investors for the tax disadvantage of dividend income.  In the case where 
capital gains taxes can be easily deferred (Tg = 0), the coefficient a3 should equal to the 
tax rate of the marginal investor on dividend income.32  Given that both Td and Tg are 
equal to zero in Hong Kong, there should be no relationship between dividend yields and 
risk-adjusted stock returns in our data.  Alternatively, finding a positive dividend yield 
coefficient in an economy where neither dividend income nor capital gains are taxed 
suggests there are nontax reasons that drive the relation between returns and dividend 
yields.   
In section 3.4.2.1 we analyze the abnormal returns of different portfolios ranked 
by lagged dividend yield.  In section 3.4.2.2 we quantify the magnitude of dividend yield 
effect using regression analysis.  Section 3.4.2.3 reports some robustness tests. 
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3.4.2.1 Dividend-yield portfolios.  In June of each year in the sample, stocks are 
classified into portfolios based on their lagged dividend yield.  We use two different 
classifications, six portfolios and 11 portfolios.  For each classification, the first portfolio 
contains all zero yield stocks in that year.  The remaining stocks are then allocated 
according to their dividend yields such that each of the other portfolios contains roughly 
equal numbers of stocks.  Both Naranjo et al. (1998) and Sialm (2009) also examine 
portfolios sorted on both dividend yield and firm size.  The small number of stocks at the 
beginning of our sample period prevents us from sorting stocks based on both dividend 
yield and size. 
For each portfolio, we calculate value-weighted returns and the value-weighted 
dividend yield of the portfolio.  Returns are computed on a monthly basis and following 
Sialm (2009), the portfolio dividend yields are updated annually. Table 12 columns 1 and 
2 report the average dividend yield in the portfolio formation year and in the following 
year after portfolio formation. As seen in the table, although there is evidence of mean 
reversion in dividend yields, the yields are nonetheless quite persistent and the portfolio 
rankings based on their dividend yields are maintained in the post-formation period. 
To investigate the relationship between abnormal returns and dividend yields it is 
important to adequately control for differences in risk.  One possible reason that dividend 
yields might be related to stock returns is that the dividend yield proxies for loadings on 
some omitted risk factors.  For example, Fama and French (1992, 1993) find that a single 
market factor is insufficient to describe the cross-section of stock returns in the U.S.  
They propose a three-factor model that includes factors associated with firm size and the 




the cross-section of stock returns.  Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2009), use size and 
book-to-market-factors to control for risk in other countries, including Hong Kong.  
Following Naranjo et al. (1998) and Sialm (2009), we report results using risk-adjusted 
returns based on both the CAPM and the three-factor model.33  Specifically we calculate 
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Where )(
,, tFtk rr − , )( ,, tFtM rr − , )( ,, tBtS rr − , )( ,, tLtH rr −  are the values of excess 
return on the kth dividend yield portfolio, the market factor, the size and book-to-market 
factors, respectively. The portfolio factor loadings MTk ,β , 
SMB
Tk ,β , 
HML
Tk ,β  are allowed to 
differ across each nonoverlapping five-year period in the sample. The factor loadings are 
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Table 12 columns 3 and 4 report means abnormal returns for each dividend yield 
portfolio, based on the CAPM and three-factor adjusted returns, respectively.  Figure 3 
graphically displays the results for the 11 dividend yield portfolios based on the three-
factor adjusted returns. There is a nearly monotonic relationship between dividend yields 
and abnormal returns across portfolios.  Focusing on the three-factor adjusted returns for 
the 11 dividend yield portfolios in column 4 of panel A, the difference in abnormal 
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returns between the highest yield portfolio and the zero-yield portfolio is 1.5% per month 
(p-value < 0.01).  By way of comparison, Naranjo et al (1998) report a difference in 
returns between the highest yield decile and the zero-yield portfolio of approximately 
0.5% per month.  Part of the large difference in returns is driven by the very low 
abnormal returns on the zero-yield portfolio, a finding also documented by Naranjo et al 
(1998).  To be sure that the results we document are not driven by the zero-yield 
portfolio, we also report the difference in returns between the highest and lowest yield 
decile portfolios.  Based on the three-factor adjusted returns this difference is 1.0% per 
month (p-value < 0.01).  Panel B of the table repeats the analysis for the six portfolio 
classification.  Consistent with the result in panel A, there is a strong dividend yield 
effect in returns.  Moreover, this effect is economically large, over 12% per year on an 
annualized basis.  This effect is difficult to reconcile with the tax capitalization 
hypothesis, given that both capital gains and dividend yields are untaxed in Hong Kong. 
3.4.2.2 Regression analysis.  The previous section suggests there exists a positive 
relation between risk-adjusted returns and dividend yields.  To directly quantify the 
magnitude of the yield effect we use a regression approach similar to that employed by 
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where dyk,t is the expected monthly dividend yield of portfolio k at month t.  The factor 
loadings MTk ,β , 
SMB
Tk ,β , 
HML
Tk ,β  are estimated for each portfolio and are allowed to differ in 
each 5-year period.  The coefficient on the dividend yield is of special interest.  Under the 
tax capitalization hypothesis, the coefficient estimate should equal the difference in the 




capitalization hypothesis predicts that the coefficient estimate on the dividend yield 
should be zero.  Alternatively, finding a nonzero coefficient estimate on the dividend 
yield indicates that there are nontax reasons that drive the yield-return relation. 
Table 13 reports the results.  Focusing on the three-factor adjusted returns, the 
coefficient estimates on the dividend yield are all positive and significantly different from 
zero.  Based on the 11 portfolio classification, the coefficient estimates range from 1.26 
(p-value < 0.01) when the zero-yield portfolio is included to 0.94 (p-value < 0.01) when 
the zero-yield portfolio is excluded.36  Economically, the coefficient estimates indicate 
that a one percent increase in dividend yields is associated with an approximately one 
percent increase in risk-adjusted returns.  Under the tax capitalization hypothesis, this 
would require a difference in dividend and capital gains tax rates of 100%. 
3.4.2.3 Robustness tests.  To assess the robustness of our results Table 14 reports 
the coefficient estimates on the dividend yield variable from regression equation (4) 
above for subsamples segmented by time period and firm size.  To examine the yield 
effect in different time periods, we divide our sample of 306 months (July 1980 to 
December 2005) into two equal subperiods.  Table 14, panel A reports the coefficient 
estimates on the dividend yield for the two subperiods.  Based on the three-factor model, 
the coefficient estimate on the dividend yield is 0.83 (p-value < 0.10) in the first 
subperiod, and 1.54 (p-value < 0.01) in the second subperiod.  The lower statistical 
significance in the first subperiod is likely driven by the much smaller number of stocks 
in this time period.  In both periods, however, the yield effect is economically large. 
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Naranjo et al. (1998) find that the dividend yield effect in their sample is absent in 
the largest quartile of NYSE firms.  To examine size effects in our sample, we divide our 
sample into small and large firms based on the market capitalization at the end of June of 
each sample year. Firms are included in the large-firm (small-firm) subsample if the 
firm’s size is greater (smaller) than median size in that sample year.  Within each 
subsample, we further divide stocks into 11 dividend yield portfolios as described earlier.  
Table 14, panel B reports the coefficient estimates on the dividend yield for the large-
firm and small-firm subsamples.  The dividend yield coefficients are of similar 
magnitude and are statistically significant for both size groups.  The magnitude of the 
yield effect is slightly larger for the small-firm subsample, but the difference is 
economically small.  Overall, the dividend yield effect appears to be a robust 
phenomenon.  The consistency of the effect in an economy where dividends and capital 
gains are not taxed provides additional evidence that is difficult to reconcile with the tax 
capitalization hypothesis. 
 
3.5 Time-series evidence 
The previous section shows that there is strong positive relation between the 
dividend yield and risk-adjusted stock returns in the cross-section in a no-tax 
environment.  In this section we provide additional evidence regarding the tax 
capitalization hypothesis by examining the time-series relationship between the aggregate 
dividend yield and aggregate equity valuations.  The methodology closely parallels Sialm 
(2009), who shows that aggregate equity valuations are lower at times when the overall 




no relationship between the aggregate dividend yield and equity valuations in Hong 
Kong. 
3.5.1 Data and variables 
To measure equity valuations we use the Datastream Hong Kong Total Market 
Index to present Hong Kong aggregate market. This index includes approximately 130 
equity securities and covers at least 75% of the market capitalization.37  While the data 
for cross-sectional analysis are at monthly frequency, the data for time-series analysis are 
at annual frequency.  We employ two measures of aggregate equity valuation, the price-
earnings ratio and the total return on the index.  Datastream defines the Price-Earnings 
ratio as the ratio between current price to current earning.  To follow Sialm (2009) who 
defines the price-earnings ratio as the current price to earnings in the subsequent year, we 
calculate the price-earnings ratio as Datastream’s subsequent year Price-Earnings ratio 
adjusted to reflect the change in the index price level over the year.  In addition to the 
aggregate dividend yield, we also control for a number of macroeconomic variables, 
including the six-month interest rate, inflation, and GDP growth. 
Table 15 reports summary statistics of the macroeconomic variables.  The Hong 
Kong price-earnings ratio, divided by 100, has a mean of 0.146, similar to 0.144 for the 
aggregate U.S. data reported in Sialm (2009).  The index’s dividend yield has a mean of 
4.2%, compared to 4.5% for the U.S. data.  During the sample period, the index has an 
average return of 18.6% per year. 
The Hong Kong stock market data begins in 1973.  However, the 6-month deposit 
rate series begins only in 1985.  As an alternative measure of the interest rate, we use the 
U.S. 6-month CD rate.  The interest rates in the two countries should be highly correlated 
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because the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the U.S. dollar.  Indeed, the correlation 
between these two series is 0.81 for the overlapping period.  The inflation rate is 
calculated based on the composite CPI that begins in 1982.  The website of Hong Kong 
Census and Statistics Department also provides CPI series A, B and C in addition to the 
composite CPI.38  These series represent the CPI for households with low, medium and 
high expenditures, respectively.  The series A, B and C begin in 1975.  Thus, as an 
alternative measure of inflation measure, we also use inflation rate based on CPI series 
B.39  Our most comprehensive sample, thus covers the 32 year period from 1975-2008. 
 
3.5.2 Methodology and empirical results 
Following Sialm (2009), we estimate the following regression to quantify the 
relation between the aggregate dividend yield and the valuation level: 
tttttt tgrdyval εββπββββ ++++++= 543210       (5) 
We use the aggregate price-earnings ratio as dependent variable valt to proxy for 
aggregate equity valuation.  The independent variables include annual dividend yield dyt, 
short term interest rate rt, inflation rate πt, GDP per capita growth rate gt, and time trend t 
that takes value 1 for the year of 1973. 
The tax capitalization hypothesis predicts high tax burden leads to low equity 
valuation.  In case of Hong Kong, the tax capitalization hypothesis implies that dividend 
yield has no effect on equity valuation.  Alternatively, finding negative relationship of the 
dividend yield with valuation indicates that there are nontax reasons that drive the yield-
valuation relations.       




 All macroeconomic variables are from Datastream except CPI (B) that is from Census and Statistics 




Table 16, columns 1-3 report regression results.  Dividend yield has a significant 
negative effect on equity valuation.  In an univariate regression the coefficient on 
dividend yield is -1.39, with control variables added the effect decreases to -1.06.  At the 
aggregate level, the dividend effect in Hong Kong is smaller than that reported in Sialm 
(2009) for the US, where the coefficients are -3.75 and -3.15.  In unreported results, we 
find the dividend yield effect is robust when price-to-dividend ratio is used as proxy for 
valuation level. 
The tax capitalization hypothesis predicts high tax burden results in not only low 
equity valuation but also in high equity return.  Columns 4-6 report the results where we 
estimate equation (5) with index return as dependent variable.  The coefficient of 
dividend yield is 12.06 in a univariate regression and 17.16 when control variables 
included.  Sialm (2009) reports a coefficient of 4.67 and 5.16 on the effective tax yield.  
Overall, our time-series analysis provides additional evidence that tax capitalization 
cannot be a sole drive of yield-return relation.    
 
3.6 Conclusion 
A long standing question in financial economics is whether investor level taxes 
are reflected in asset prices.  One view is that the tax payments on dividends and capital 
gains are capitalized into stock prices resulting in a positive relationship between equity 
returns and the tax burden imposed on investors.  This tax hypothesis is supported by the 
theoretical work in Brennan (1970), the CAPM with tax, and empirically verified by 





However, some evidence exists that challenges the tax hypothesis.  The 
documented dividend yield effect is too large to be solely attributed to tax and the effect 
does not vary across different tax regimes.  In addition, the effect is not present in large 
firms.  This evidence leads to a second view on the dividend yield effect.  There are 
omitted factors or variables that cause the relationship between dividend yields and 
returns.  In this case, the yield-return relationship is just a spurious one as dividend yield 
also is affected by these omitted factors or variables. 
In this paper we propose a novel approach.  The Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region does not levy tax on either dividend income or capital gains and 
thus provides a unique economic setting in which to examine the tax capitalization 
hypothesis.  We document a robust positive relation between the dividend yield and stock 
returns in the Hong Kong market that is very similar in magnitude to the effect 
documented in the U.S. market.  In addition to the cross-sectional results, we also provide 
time-series evidence. In the Hong Kong market, there is a robust negative relation 
between the aggregate dividend yield and aggregate equity valuations.  In other words, 
during times when the dividend yield is high (low), aggregate equity values tend to be 
low (high). 
Consistent with the second view, our paper suggests that there are nontax reasons 
that cause the relationship between dividend yields and returns.  Our findings do not 
necessarily invalidate the Brennan (1970) after-tax CAPM, nor do they completely rule 
out taxes as one of the drivers of the dividend yield effect.  Our contribution is to 




in practice and to urge caution in interpreting the dividend yield effect as evidence in 
support of the tax capitalization hypothesis. 
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Number of stocks in the sample. 
Hong Kong data obtained from DataStream for period from January 1973 to 
December 200540.  Only security type EQ is included.  Firms that have one or more of the 
following are excluded: average monthly turnover (shares traded divided to shares 
outstanding) less than 0.73% (5th percentile of turnover distribution), percentage of no-
trade days greater than 50%, six or greater continuous months of no-trade.  Firm-month 
observations that have one or more of the following are excluded: missing market 
capitalization, missing price, missing unadjusted price, missing return index, return index 
equal zero, missing dividend yield.  Dividend yield is winsorized at 99th percentile, return 
is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.  Padded monthly zero-return series at the end 
of the sample are deleted (see text for discussion).  The figure shows the number of all 










                                                 
40
 Dividend yield is defined as prior-year paid dividend divided to price one year ago. Thus, even thought 
our data start from Jan 1973, the first time portfolios are forms is June 1974. For analysis of dividend yield 
and abnormal return, we limit the sample to July 2000 to December 2005, the period that Fama-French 














Hong Kong market value-weighted dividend yield trend. 
















Fama-French model abnormal returns. 
Figure presents means of abnormal returns of 11 dividend yield portfolios.  
Portfolios are formed annually end of June, one zero yield portfolio and 10 positive yield 
deciles.  Abnormal returns are calculated monthly for the whole period 7/1980-12/2005 
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 We thank Andrew Ang, Robert Hodrick, Yuhang Xing and Xiaoyan Zhang for kindly sharing Hong 
Kong Fama-French factors. For more details see Ang et al. (2009). 
42
 Five nonoverlapping periods (1980-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000 and 2001-2005) are used to 
allow the factor loadings to change overtime. Thus T takes values from 1 to 5. For the case of 11 dividend 






Number of stocks in the sample. 
Hong Kong data obtained from DataStream for period from January 1973 to 
December 2005. Only security type EQ is included. Firms that have one or more of the 
following are excluded: average monthly turnover (shares traded divided to shares 
outstanding) less than 0.73% (5-percentile of turnover cut-off), percentage of no-trade 
days greater than 50%, six or greater continuous months of no-trade. Firm-month 
observations that have one or more of the following are excluded: missing market 
capitalization, missing price, missing unadjusted price, missing return index, return index 
equal zero, missing dividend yield. Dividend yield is winsorized at 99th-percentile, return 
is winsorized at the 1st- and 99th-percentile. Padded monthly zero-return series at the end 
of the sample are deleted (see text for discussion). The table reports the number of all 



























         
1974 42 41 1  1990 189 166 23 
1975 42 41 1  1991 197 174 23 
1976 43 40 3  1992 214 184 30 
1977 43 41 2  1993 257 225 32 
1978 43 41 2  1994 311 266 45 
1979 43 40 3  1995 354 293 61 
1980 43 41 2  1996 367 283 84 
1981 45 43 2  1997 389 283 106 
1982 49 47 2  1998 434 320 114 
1983 53 51 2  1999 465 256 209 
1984 59 49 10  2000 478 246 232 
1985 64 52 12  2001 510 255 255 
1986 74 64 10  2002 553 262 291 
1987 78 67 11  2003 593 298 295 
1988 93 84 9  2004 608 331 277 






Dividend yield portfolios 
Table reports means of annual dividend yield and monthly abnormal returns.  
Portfolios are formed annually end of June.  Dividend yield is calculated annually in 
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Where )(
,, tFtk rr − , )( ,, tFtM rr − , )( ,, tBtS rr − , )( ,, tLtH rr −  are values of k portfolio’s excess 
return and of Fama-French three factors realized during month t. MTk ,β , 
SMB
Tk ,β , 
HML
Tk ,β  are 
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Returns are value-weighted and in US dollars.  Values are in percent and standard errors 
are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: 11 Dividend yield portfolios 
 Annual Dividend Yields Abnormal returns 
 Prior Year Subsequent Year CAPM Fama-French 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 












































Highest Yield Decile Minus 







Highest Minus Lowest 
Yield Decile Portfolios 
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 For ‘Prior Year’ years 1980-2004 are used, for ‘Subsequent Year’ years 1981-2005 are used 
44





Table 12 (continued) 
Panel B: 6 Dividend yield portfolios 
 Annual Dividend Yields Abnormal returns 
 Prior Year Subsequent Year CAPM Fama-French 
No Dividend 
Portfolio 
























































Dividend yield effect regressions 
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Where )(
,, tFtk rr − , )( ,, tFtM rr − , )( ,, tBtS rr − , )( ,, tLtH rr −  are values of k portfolio’s excess 
return and of Fama-French three factors realized during month t. dyk,t is expected 
dividend yield of portfolio k at month t.  Two different portfolio formations are used: one 
zero yield portfolio and 10 positive yield deciles; one zero yield and 5 positive yield 
quintiles. MTk ,β , 
SMB
Tk ,β , 
HML
Tk ,β  are estimated for each portfolio and are allowed to differ in 
each period45.  Returns are value-weighted and in US dollars.  The standard errors take 
into account clustering by month and are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote 












10 Positive Yield Deciles only 
 




















                                                 
45
 This regression equation is fitted only one time. For 11 portfolio case, for example, this regression 
estimates 167 coefficients: one alpha; 55 on market factor, 55 on SMB factor, 55 on HML factor, one on 





Dividend yield effect regressions: Subperiod and Subsample evidence 
The table reports the dividend yield coefficient γ of the regressions in described in 
table 13. 11 dividend yield portfolio classification is used. Panel A divides the sample’s 
306 months into two equal-length periods.  In panel B, subsamples are formed annually at 
the end of June. Small-firm (big-firm) subsample includes firms that below (above) 
median by market capitalization. Within each subsample, stocks are classified into 11 
dividend yield portfolios as usual.  Returns are value-weighted and in US dollars.  The 
standard errors take into account clustering by month and are reported in parentheses.  *, 
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 










































Summary Statistics of Macroeconomic Variables 
All series are from Datastream, except (7) is from Hong Kong Census and 
Statistics Department.  Data are at annual frequency and covers 36 years from 1973 to 
2008.  Missing data at the beginning years causes some series have fewer observations.  
Series (1)-(4) are for the Hong Kong Total Market Index.  Dividend yield is dividend 
paid over the current year divided by index’s price level at the end of the prior year.  
Price-Earnings (Price-Dividend) ratios are price level at the end of the current year 
divided by earnings (dividend) in the subsequent year.  Index return is based on price 
level at the ends of the current year and of subsequent year.  Inflation is calculated from 
composite CPI.  Inflation (B) is calculated from CPI (B) that is CPI for households that 
have medium expenditure. 46  Last column reports correlation with Dividend Yield. 
 




Min Max Corr 
(1) Price-Earnings Ratio (Divided 
by 100) 
35 0.128 0.050 0.084 0.367 -0.553 
(2) Price-Dividend Ratio 
(Divided by 100) 
35 0.262 0.087 0.161 0.577 -0.603 
(3) Dividend Yield 35 0.042 0.011 0.017 0.062 1 
(4) Index Return 35 0.186 0.282 -0.657 0.696 0.553 
(5) Hong Kong 6-month Deposit 
Rate  
24 0.047 0.026 0.002 0.104 0.232 
(6) Hong Kong Inflation 27 0.047 0.049 -0.039 0.113 0.644 
(7) Hong Kong Inflation (B) 33 0.055 0.052 -0.047 0.151 0.680 
(8) Hong Kong GDP per Capita 
Growth rate 
36 0.103 0.085 -0.061 0.258 0.632 
(9) US 6-month CD rate 36 0.066 0.034 0.012 0.157 0.437 
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Aggregate Dividend Yield and Aggregate Valuation Level 
tttttt tgrdyval εββπββββ ++++++= 543210      
The dependent variable valt is either Price-Earnings ratio or Market Index return47.  The 
independent variables include: expected dividend yield dyt; short-term interest rate rt; 
inflation rate πt; GDP per capita growth rate gt; and time trend t that takes value of 1 for 
year 1973. Price-Earnings, dividend yield and return are for Datastream Hong Kong Total 
Index. Data are at annual frequency and covers period of 1973-2008.  The Newey-West 
standard errors are calculated with four-year lags and reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 Price-Earnings Ratio 
(Divided by 100) 
Index return 





















  -2.75   
(1.81) 
 
US 6-month CD rate 
 
 
  0.01 
(0.18) 
  1.11    
(1.68) 





  1.36* 
(0.71) 
 




  -0.36*** 
(0.10) 
  -0.35   
(1.02) 
Hong Kong GDP per 


































-0.75**   
(0.27) 
Obs 34 23 32 34 23 32 
Adjusted R-square 0.28 0.59 0.52 0.29 0.14 0.18 
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 Valuation ratio is persistent. It is important to test for unit roots.  Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots in the 
price-earnings ratio can be rejected at one percent level.  A regression of the difference in the price-






In this dissertation, I have considered the effects of two corporate policies on 
shareholder wealth.  First, I examined the effect of dividend policy.  Firms can choose to 
follow either high- or low-dividend policies.  I investigate whether paying high dividends 
in an economy such as the U.S., where tax on dividend income is higher than tax on 
capital gains, results in higher stock required rate of return to compensate investors for 
higher tax burden.  Higher required rate of return, in turn, lowers equity valuation and 
decreases shareholder wealth.  This view is suggested by the theoretical work in Brennan 
(1970), the CAPM with tax, and empirically verified by the positive relationship between 
dividend yield and stock return in the U.S. data. 
  Still, there is a second view on the dividend-yield effect.  The positive 
relationship might be spurious, as dividend yield can be a proxy for omitted factors or 
variables.  I document a robust dividend-yield effect in the Hong Kong market, where 
neither dividend income nor capital gains are taxed.  My result is consistent with the 
second view, that there are unknown factors that affect both stock required rate of return 
and dividend policy.  In this case, paying high dividends might be a part of an optimal 




Second, I examine the effect of compensation policy.  Specifically, I consider 
whether the practice of using peer groups in setting Chief Executive Officers’ (CEO) 
compensation results in inflated pay, and thus transfers shareholder wealth to the CEOs.  
Many critics contend that the use of compensation peer groups has resulted in pay that 
cannot be justified based on economic fundamentals.  Still others argue that peer groups 
are an efficient way for the board of directors to determine the competitive pay level that 
is necessary to both retain and motivate top executives.  We examine the use of 
compensation peer groups using the mandated disclosure of peers that began in 2006. 
We document evidence to support both sides of the debate, and find that the 
wealth transfer to CEOs is relatively small.  We find that, on average, peers are chosen 
largely based on economic factors that reflect the managerial labor market in which the 
firms compete.  Compensation peer groups contain firms that are in the same industry, 
are similar in size and scope, and reflect other commonalities related to labor-market 
factors.  Nevertheless, we find that firms appear to exercise significant discretion in 
choosing peer firms.  We show that when firms deviate from the economic model of peer 
choice, they tend to pick larger firms and firms with higher CEO pay.  These biases in 
peer-group selection are more evident in smaller, less visible firms, where management 
arguably has more discretion in selecting the peer group.  Despite the evidence of peer-
group biases that we find, boards appear to only partially adjust pay in response to 
differences in compensation between the comparison group and the CEO, suggesting that 
boards exercise discretion that mitigates the effects of peer-group bias on pay increases.  
Finally, we also document preliminary evidence that increased disclosure has reduced the 
biases in peer-group choice. 
